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Rediscovering Trespass:
Towards a Regulatory Approach to Defining
Fourth Amendment Scope in a World of
Advancing Technology
MARTIN R. GARDNER†
INTRODUCTION
Any genuine understanding of the Fourth Amendment
begins with an appreciation of what governmental activities
constitute a “search” or a “seizure”1 within the meaning of the
Amendment.2 While defining activities and circumstances
constituting seizures has proven relatively unproblematic,3
the task of determining which intrusions constitute Fourth

† Steinhart Foundation Professor of Law; University of Nebraska College of Law.
The author wishes to thank Meridith Wailes for her outstanding research
assistance.
1. The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 562-63 (5th ed. 2012); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 377 (1974) (“I can think of few
constitutional issues more important than defining the reach of the [F]ourth
[A]mendment.”).
3. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 563; see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 113 (1984) (“A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.”).
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Amendment searches has proven notoriously difficult4 and
controversial.5
Since its 1967 decision in Katz v. United States,6 the
United States Supreme Court has defined the scope of the
Fourth Amendment in terms of whether governmental
actions offend a citizen’s “reasonable privacy expectations.”7
Katz is generally understood to have sounded the death knell
for an earlier approach which defined searches and seizures
as “physical trespasses” into protected areas.8 Recently, after
over fifty years’ experience with the Katz rubric, the Court
suddenly reintroduced the trespass approach as an
alternative to the privacy test in the United States v. Jones9
and Florida v. Jardines10 cases. It is now clear that protecting
interests in both property and privacy are vital Fourth
Amendment considerations.
While the full significance of the reemergence of trespass
theory is not yet clear, its recognition clearly signals that the
Court has broken with its employment of the Katz standard
as the exclusive vehicle for defining Fourth Amendment
scope. Seemingly, the Court has recognized that new
approaches are needed to resolve the complicated twenty4. One commentator opined: “[s]cope, the threshold question, has troubled the
[Supreme] Court more than any other.” Larry W. Yackle, The Burger Court and
the Fourth Amendment, 26 KAN. L. REV. 335, 355 (1978).
5. Buckets of ink have been spilt attending to the controversy. See infra notes
104-22 and accompanying text.
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz is discussed in detail infra notes 29-57 and
accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 28-56 and accompanying text.
8. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 593; Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and
New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 801, 817 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, Fourth Amendment] (“[e]xisting
scholarship generally teaches that the Supreme Court rejected the propertybased [trespass] approach . . . when it decided Katz . . . .”); Afsheen John Radsan,
The Case for Stewart over Harlan on 24/7 Physical Surveillance, 88 TEX. L. REV.
1475, 1490 (2010) (“[t]respass is no longer an important factor [in determining
searches and seizures] . . . .”).
9. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Jones is discussed in detail infra notes 155-71 and
accompanying text.
10. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). Jardines is discussed in detail infra notes 178-88
and accompanying text.
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first century balance between controlling crime and
protecting national security, while at the same time
respecting civil liberties.11 Indeed, having now freed itself
from defining searches and seizures solely in terms of privacy
expectations, the way is now clear for the Court to move even
further and adopt an approach explicitly couched in terms of
regulating unacceptable governmental conduct as a third
alternative to the privacy and property tests already in place.
Unlike those perspectives which are grounded in atomistic
rights to privacy and property respectively, the regulatory
viewpoint12 addresses the constitutionality of the
government’s conduct in a given case as it impacts protected
interests of society in general without necessarily assessing
the effects on any particular parties affected thereby.
This Article traces the developments which have left the
Court poised to embrace a regulatory test alternate as the
means to protect “persons . . . against unreasonable searches
and seizures”13 in the modern era of technological information
gathering. The discussion begins with an exploration of the
problematic nature of Katz and a review of its progeny, most
of which employs controversial assumption of risk analysis
as a basis for denying Fourth Amendment coverage. Before
turning to Jones and Jardines, I discuss Kyllo v. United
States,14 a precursor to those cases. I argue that these three
cases signal the Court’s inclination to adopt a new regulatory
alternative. In anticipation of such a move, I formulate a
specific test which I recommend the Court adopt if it indeed
seeks a regulatory criterion to address threats to privacy
posed by advanced technology—threats presently rendered
outside Fourth Amendment protection under the current

11. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 47 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[I]t seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow . . . as the use of intrusive
equipment becomes more readily available.”). Kyllo is discussed in detail infra
notes 133-54 and accompanying text.
12. The distinction between “atomistic” versus “regulatory” approaches to
determine Fourth Amendment searches is discussed infra notes 50-56 and
accompanying text.
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. See supra note 11.
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expectation of privacy and trespass to property standards.15 I
argue that any adoption of a regulatory test should
supplement rather than replace the present atomistic
standards, with the new test being utilized in a given case
only after no Fourth Amendment searches result from
scrutiny under first Jones/Jardines then Katz. Finally,
where the regulatory test is applicable, I argue that the Court
should exercise restraint in putting it to use in deference to
the superior competence of other branches of government to
address the complicated Fourth Amendment problems posed
by modern technology.
I. FROM TRESPASS TO EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
It has long been understood that the Fourth Amendment
is inapplicable without a “search or seizure,” no matter how
unreasonable a governmental16 intrusion would appear to
be.17 On the other hand, if a given intrusion constitutes a
search or seizure affecting “persons, houses, papers, and
effects,” the intrusion must be “reasonable” under the Fourth
Amendment.18 While historically there arguably existed no
necessary connection between the warrant provisions of the
Amendment and its reasonableness requirement,19 the
15. See infra notes 192-203 and accompanying text. No attempt is made in this
Article to assess the constitutionality of such technological threats under the
proposed regulatory standard.
16. In order for the Fourth Amendment to apply, searches and seizures must
be conducted by governmental officials and not private parties. See Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (explaining it is not unconstitutional for
private employer to seize incriminating papers of employee and turn them over
to law enforcement officials).
17. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 356 (“Law enforcement practices are not
required . . . to be reasonable unless they are either ‘searches’ or ‘seizures.’”).
Moreover, searches and seizures are not governed by the Fourth Amendment
unless they are related to “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Id.
18. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
64-74 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 757, 771-72 (1994) (“[T]he Founders viewed judges . . . with suspicion . . . .
The [Fourth] Amendment’s Warrant Clause does not require, presuppose, or even
encourage warrants—it limits them. . . . The Framers did not exalt warrants, for
a warrant was issued ex parte by a government official on the imperial payroll
and had the purpose and effect of precluding any common law trespass suit the
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Supreme Court has expressed a “strong preference”20 that
searches be supported by warrants, to the point that some
refer to a warrant “requirement”21 subject to a variety of
exceptions.22
In articulating the meaning of searches and seizures, the
Supreme Court initially required a physical trespass by the
government into a protected area for the purpose of gathering
evidence. Thus, in Olmstead v. United States,23 the Court
found the Fourth Amendment inapplicable when federal
officials listened to a private conversation by means of a
wiretap—placed on phone lines supported by poles running
in public space24—because the interceptions “were not in the
house of either party to the conversation.”25 Arguably, such
aggrieved target might try to bring before a local jury after the search or seizure
occurred.”); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (explaining warrants were not required historically, but instead were
employed to insulate officials from liability imposed by colonial juries). But see
Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1707, 1713 (1996) (reviewing William John Cuddihy, The Fourth
Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602-1791 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with UMI Dissertation
Services)) (“[T]he [Fourth] Amendment’s original meaning dictated that ‘specific
warrants were mandatory and were intended to be the conventional method of
search and seizure.’”) (quoting Cuddihy, supra).
20. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 559.
21. See, e.g., CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 97-103 (arrest warrant
requirement), 148-51 (search warrant requirements) (5th ed. 2008).
22. Professor LaFave has identified exceptions to include: cases of emergency
which excuse failures to obtain warrants; situations involving “diminished
expectations of privacy[,]” including consensual searches; and searches incident
to arrest. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 566-72. Moreover, Fourth Amendment
intrusions justified by “reasonable suspicion” rather than the more stringent
“probable cause” standard need not be supported by warrants. See WHITEBREAD
& SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 253-96 (discussing Terry “stops and frisks”); see
also MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE LAW 137-46 (4th ed. 2014)
(discussing school searches and seizures based on “reasonable suspicion.”).
23. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
24. Id. at 456-57.
25. Id. at 466. The Court viewed wiretapping as an insufficient “use of
governmental force to search a man’s house, his person, his papers and his effects”
necessary to trigger the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 463. Similar to Olmstead, the
Court found no Fourth Amendment applicability when federal agents placed an
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an approach made sense at a time when the government’s
primary means of discovering information about people
amounted to physically interfering with their property.26 The
physical trespass doctrine clearly proved inadequate,
however, to address governmental intrusions in an era of
developing technology.27
A. Katz and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
In response to perceived inadequacies of the physical
trespass doctrine,28 the Court broke new ground in Katz, a
case involving governmental interception of telephone
conversations which were obtained when the police attached
an electronic listening device to the outside of a public phone
booth.29 Unbeknownst to Katz, his end of the conversations
were recorded and later used to convict him of illegally
transmitting wagering information.30

amplifying device against a partition wall of an office, again because there was no
physical intrusion into the space from which conversations were overhead. See
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942). On the other hand, the Court
found that the attachment of a “spike mike” into the heating duct of a home,
amplifying the sounds therein, constituted a physical trespass, thus triggering
Fourth Amendment applicability. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 51112 (1961).
26. See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV.
1511, 1517-18 (2010) [hereinafter Solove, Pragmatism].
27. See infra note 28.
28. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). As did Olmstead, Katz
involved governmental listening to telephone conversations. Without elaboration,
the Katz Court noted that the telephone had “come to play [a vital role] in private
communication[,]” suggesting technological advancement since 1928, the year of
the Olmstead decision. Id. at 352. Justice Harlan was more specific, arguing for
overruling the cases requiring physical trespass of a protected area by a tangible
object: “[Those cases] should now be overruled. [Their] limitation on Fourth
Amendment protection is, in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for
reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as
physical invasion.” Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 348 (majority opinion).
30. Id.
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In reversing the conviction, the Court abandoned the
Olmstead physical trespass requirement,31 thus rejecting the
government’s argument that no Fourth Amendment search
occurred because the listening device in Katz did not
physically penetrate “a constitutionally protected area.”32
Rather than focusing on trespasses to property, the Court
shifted its attention to a privacy analysis, finding that the
action of the government “violated the privacy upon which
[Katz] justifiably relied while using the [phone] and thus
constituted a [Fourth Amendment] ‘search and seizure.’”33
The Court elaborated:
[T]he . . . Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.34

Having found the attachment of the listening device a Fourth
Amendment search, the Court deemed it “unreasonable” for
want of a supporting warrant.35

31. The Court noted the Fourth Amendment “protects people—and not simply
‘areas’— . . . [therefore,] the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.” Id. at 353.
32. Id. at 349-50.
33. Id. at 353. The Court also observed, however, that the “Fourth Amendment
cannot be translated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy,’” noting that
some of the Amendment’s protections “have nothing to do with privacy at all.” Id.
at 350.
34. Id. at 351-52. As will be discussed later, the “knowing exposure to the
public” concept expressed in the text planted the seed for the idea that one
assumes the risk of privacy invasions, thus negating the possibility of Fourth
Amendment protection, when she exposes otherwise private areas of life to others.
See infra notes 57-118 and accompanying text. Justice White made the point
explicitly: “When one man speaks to another he takes all the risks ordinarily
inherent in so doing, including the risk that the man to whom he speaks will make
public what he has heard. The Fourth Amendment does not protect against
unreliable (or law-abiding) associates.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 363 n.* (White, J.,
concurring).
35. The Court found that warrantless searches are “per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and welldefined exceptions.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, 359.
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Of perhaps even greater significance than the Court’s
opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan offered a concurrence in
which he articulated the standard which would become
virtually the sole measure of Fourth Amendment scope until
the recent reemergence of the trespass doctrine.36 Harlan
formulated the test for defining searches and seizures as
follows: “[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”37 Harlan went on to
explain that even in one’s home, “objects, activities, or
statements” exposed by the homeowner to the “plain view” of
outsiders are outside the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.38
Harlan’s two-prong test has proven extremely
controversial.39 The relevance of a subjective expectation of
privacy as a necessary condition for rendering an intrusion a
non-search is obviously questionable. The requirement would
seem to permit the government to circumvent a historically
held expectation of privacy by simply notifying the public
that systematic invasions of the expectation would begin to
occur regularly.40 Notwithstanding such problems, the
36. Thomas K. Clancy, United States v. Jones: Fourth Amendment
Applicability in the 21st Century, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 303, 307 (2012) (Harlan
adopted this test, “at least in large part,” to define the Fourth Amendment’s
protections); see infra notes 60-111 and accompanying text.
37. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. Id. Such language reiterates the assumption of risk notions suggested by
the Katz majority and by Justice White in his concurrence. See supra note 34.
39. Ironically, Harlan himself eventually disavowed the test. See United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); infra notes 57-59 and
accompanying text. Even so, the Court continues to employ the Harlan test as the
primary vehicle to determining Fourth Amendment searches and seizures. See
infra notes 49-111 and accompanying text.
40. Subjective expectations of privacy “[have] no place in . . . a theory of what
the [F]ourth [A]mendment protects.” Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 384.
Otherwise, “the government could diminish each person’s subjective expectation
of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was being
advanced . . . and that we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive
electronic surveillance.” Id.; see also Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and
Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529,
535-37 (1978) (favoring abandoning the subjective expectation requirement). The
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Supreme Court continues to give lip service to the subjective
expectation of privacy formulation,41 although that factor is
seldom actually meaningful as cases are usually examined
solely in terms of whether a “reasonable expectation of
privacy existed.”42
No less controversial is the test’s second, “objective,”
prong. The Court’s recognition that searches necessarily
entail intrusions of “reasonable expectations of privacy”
creates at least two kinds of problems: (1) definitional issues
inherent in the term “reasonable”; and (2) questions
surrounding the wisdom of framing the test in terms of
privacy expectations. These problems will be considered in
turn.
1. “Reasonable”: An Empirical or Normative Modifier?
The adjective “reasonable” is a notoriously vague term used
throughout the law.43 The term is ambiguous, sometimes

Supreme Court has recognized the problems with the subjective expectation of
privacy requirement:
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz’ two-pronged
inquiry would provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment
protection. For example, if the Government were suddenly to announce
on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to
warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any
actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects.
Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this
Nation’s traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously
monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of
privacy regarding the contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In
such circumstances, where an individual’s subjective expectations had
been “conditioned” by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play
no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection was. In determining whether a “legitimate expectation of
privacy” existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1979).
41. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 583-84.
42. Id. Sometimes the Court even refers to the Katz formulation as simply the
“reasonable ‘expectation of privacy’” test. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9
(1968).
43. One need only think of such standards as “beyond a reasonable doubt” or
“reasonable suspicion” to appreciate the open-ended nature of the term.
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meaning empirically normal,44 and at other times connoting
the normative notion of legitimacy.45 It should be noted that
in explicating the reach of Fourth Amendment protection,
Justice Harlan employed the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” language rather than utilizing the Court’s
“justifiable reliance on privacy” rubric.46 The majority’s
terminology sounds decidedly normative. As Professor
Amsterdam observed: “Mr. Katz’s conversation in a pay
telephone booth was protected because he ‘justifiably relied’
upon its being protected—relied, not in the sense of an
expectation, but in the sense of a claim of right.”47 Thus, in
attempting to clearly articulate the standard defining Fourth
Amendment scope, Justice Harlan actually introduced
additional uncertainty. It is not clear whether his test was
meant to entail normative judgments, ones that define
expectations citizens have a right to assert against the
government, or simply descriptive ones inviting a focus on
those expectations normal people in fact possess.
While Justice Harlan would eventually disavow his Katz
standard altogether in favor of an unabashedly normative
test,48 the Court continues to utilize the reasonable
expectation framework in a decidedly non-normative
manner. As will be discussed later in detail, the Court has
repeatedly relied on Katz’s “knowing exposure to public”

44. One meaning of “reasonable” is “[b]eing within the bounds of common
sense.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.
2000). Professor LaFave adds that the term sometimes is understood as
“statistical[ly] probab[le].” 1 LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 586.
45. One commentator noted: “If the [F]ourth [A]mendment is to
protect . . . privacy . . . it must consider what citizens have a right to expect rather
than society’s current expectations. A public opinion poll cannot
define . . . reasonable expectation.” Bacigal, supra note 40, at 536.
46. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
47. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 385. The majority standard directs courts to
bestow Fourth Amendment protection to expectations of privacy which are
“justifiable and desirable.” Bacigal, supra note 40, at 543; see also Richard Sobel
et al., The Fourth Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo, and Jones: Reinstating
Justifiable Reliance as a More Secure Constitutional Standard for Privacy, 22
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 22-23, 26 (2013) (justifiable reliance is based on legal norms).
48. See infra text accompanying note 59.
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language49 to find, as an empirical matter, that privacy
expectations are negated when various risks of invasion are
assumed.
2. Expectations of Privacy: Vindicating Atomistic Rights
or Regulating Government? It has long been understood that
the Fourth Amendment can be understood either “as a
collection of protections of atomistic spheres of interest of
individual citizens or as a regulation of governmental
conduct.”50 By focusing on privacy expectations, the Supreme
Court has clearly embraced the atomistic view.51 Unless
reasonable privacy interests of an individual citizen have
been offended,52 the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable no
matter how reprehensible governmental action may
otherwise appear.53 Thus, for example, if a citizen invites a
49. See supra text accompanying note 34.
50. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 367.
51. Id.
52. Not only does Fourth Amendment applicability depend on the presence of
a search or seizure under Katz, but it also depends on the person challenging the
intrusion. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978) (holding passengers
in car could not contest the possible illegality of police gathering of evidence from
the car because passengers lacked sufficient privacy expectations in the car).
Rakas reduced traditional Fourth Amendment “standing” issues to the search
and seizure issue under Katz. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at
141-48.
53. To illustrate the point, Professor Amsterdam posed a now famous
hypothetical where the police appear to blatantly violate the Fourth Amendment
but act outside the scope of the Amendment because no atomistic privacy
expectation is violated under Katz:
Suppose that two men drive into Minneapolis and rent a hotel room,
paying in advance for three nights. During the first night, they plan a
bank robbery which they execute the next day. Following the robbery,
they drive directly out of town, never returning to the hotel. Late that
same evening, policemen go the rounds of the local cheap hotels, armed
with a police artist’s sketch of the unmasked half of one bank robber’s
face drawn from a bystander’s description. The night manager tells the
officers that the sketch looks like one of the guys in room 212. From
outside the hotel, the officers observe that the lights in 212 are lit. The
night manager informs them that the occupants checked in yesterday
afternoon for three days. After obtaining the manager’s permission, the
officers break the door of room 212 in force with drawn guns. No one is
there, of course; but the officers find and take away a penciled map of the
bank area, parts cut from a stocking to make a stocking mask, and other
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police officer to search the citizen’s home but the officer does
not hear and is thus unaware of the invitation, no Fourth
Amendment search occurs even though the officer—from his
point of view—barges into the home and conducts a
nonconsensual, warrantless intrusion.54 While such an
intrusion would appear to demand regulation as the
quintessential Fourth Amendment intrusion, no search
occurs under the atomistic view since the citizen relinquished
her privacy interests by inviting the officer into her home.55
Adherence to the atomistic approach has led the Court to
the view that privacy expectations are not reasonable, and
items that are later sought to be used in evidence to connect the former
occupants of the room with the bank robbery after their apprehension.
On the defendants’ motion to suppress this evidence, the first question
that the court will ask is whether any violation of the [F]ourth
[A]mendment occurred. From the perspective of the occupants, room 212
was “abandoned” and they had no constitutionally protected interest in
it at the time of the search. From the perspective of the police, however,
the room appeared to be occupied; they entered it upon that assumption;
and it is difficult to imagine a more egregious case of the kind of police
conduct that the [F]ourth [A]mendment was designed to prevent.
Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 368.
Another commentator recently observed: “[W]e might want to regulate
government information gathering even when it does not violate privacy.” Solove,
Pragmatism, supra note 26, at 1525.
The distinction between atomistic and regulatory approaches discussed in the
text is similar to that manifested in the two contrasting views utilized to define
the entrapment defense. Under the “subjective” test, the focus is on the atomistic
situation of the person allegedly entrapped, specifically whether he or she was
“predisposed” to commit the crime at the time of the government’s instigation. See
WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 546-55. The “objective” view, on the
other hand, focuses on regulating the undesirable governmental conduct
regardless of the subjective predispositions of the person raising the defense. Id.
at 556-58.
54. I have previously explored the implications of the “uncommunicated actual
consent” hypothetical in Martin R. Gardner, Consent as a Bar to Fourth
Amendment Scope—A Critique of a Common Theory, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 443, 458-60 (1980).
55. Id.; see also Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in
Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119,
148 (2002) (“[g]iving consent to a search . . . means voluntarily allowing the police
to look at . . . what would otherwise be private,” thus rendering the police
intrusion a nonsearch).
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thus without Fourth Amendment protection, in situations
where a citizen is found to have assumed the risk that the
alleged private matter at issue will be made public, 56
regardless of how unreasonable the governmental conduct
might appear. These assumption of risk implications,
entailed in the emphasis on atomistic privacy expectations,
eventually led Justice Harlan to reject his two-part test in
favor of a normative regulatory approach to defining searches
and seizures.57 In a case where an undercover governmental
informer, wearing a hidden monitoring device, engaged a
suspect in conversations overhead by police officers, the
Court found that no search occurred because the defendant
assumed the risk that his confidant might be
untrustworthy.58 Justice Harlan sharply objected:
The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective
expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our
expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections
of laws that translate into rules the custom and values of the past
and present.
Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror
and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations
and risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon
society. The critical question, therefore, is whether under our
system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should
impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer
without at least the protection of a warrant requirement.
This question must . . . be answered by assessing the nature of a
particular practice and the likely extent of its impact on the
individual’s sense of security balanced against the utility of the
conduct as a technique of law enforcement.59

To appreciate the strength of the argument for a test
such as that recommended by Justice Harlan, it is necessary
to understand how firmly ensconced in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence the Katz assumption of risk doctrine has
become. Thus, in the discussion immediately following, I

56. See infra notes 60-111 and accompanying text.
57. See infra text accompanying note 59.
58. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746-47, 752-53 (1971).
59. Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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document the prevalence of the doctrine and describe its
controversial nature.
B. The Katz Progeny: Assumption of Risk to the Forefront
Justice Harlan’s criticism of the role played by
assumption of risk analysis in application of the Katz
expectation of privacy test is shared by many
commentators.60 One has described such analysis as a move
that undergirds “almost all of the Court’s cases defining the
meaning of a Fourth Amendment ‘search,’” creating a
“doctrinal position that is untenable.”61 Nevertheless, in
reliance on the Katz invitation to disregard what one
“knowingly exposes to the public” as a Fourth Amendment
search, the Court has employed risk analysis as a means of
disqualifying situations from Fourth Amendment protection
in two contexts: (1) in cases where the possibility of public
disclosure is deemed to negate privacy expectations;62 and (2)
in cases where an intentional sharing of an otherwise private
matter with another is equated with sharing the matter with
the world, given the risk that the other may share the matter
with a third party.63 Without attempting a discussion of the
full panoply of the Court’s cases, I will highlight several
examples from both of the two categories.
1. Possible Public Disclosure as Negating Privacy
Expectation. While Katz specifies that “knowing” exposure to
the public negates privacy expectations,64 subsequent cases
have gone further in holding such negations where the Court
perceives a mere risk that a public disclosure will occur.
60. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 590.
61. Colb, supra note 55, at 121; see infra text accompanying note 117.
62. Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth
Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 627 (1989) (criticizing the Court for
focusing on the degree of public exposure rather than “simply the fact of public
exposure, or worse, the mere possibility of public exposure” under Katz); see cases
discussed infra notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
63. See Colb, supra note 55, at 122; cases discussed infra notes 82-111 and
accompanying text. This analysis is often referred to as “the third-party doctrine.”
See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
64. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
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Thus, in United States v. Knotts,65 the Court found no Fourth
Amendment violation when police placed an electronic
monitoring device in a five-gallon drum containing
chloroform—which had been purchased by one of Knotts’s codefendants—and subsequently utilized the device to monitor
the movements of a car carrying the chloroform.66 In finding
that the monitoring did not constitute a search under Katz,
the Court appealed to the assumption of risk analysis of a
prior case67 in noting that:
Visual surveillance from public places along [the car’s]
route . . . would have sufficed to reveal all of [the car’s movements]
to the police. The fact that the officers in this case relied not only
on visual surveillance, but also on the use of the [monitoring device]
to signal the presence of [the] automobile to the police receiver, does
not alter the situation.68

Therefore, “[a] person travelling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy . . . from one place to another” because when one
travels over public streets, “he voluntarily convey[s] to
anyone who want[s] to look the fact that he [is] travelling
over particular roads in a particular direction.”69
Similarly, in California v. Ciraolo,70 the Court found no
invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy when police
flew an airplane over the respondent’s house and detected
marijuana plants growing in his yard even though the
respondent had enclosed his yard with a ten-foot fence.71 The
65. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
66. Id. at 277.
67. Id. at 283 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1979)). Smith
is discussed in detail infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
68. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
69. Id. at 281-82. In a subsequent case, United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
714 (1984), the Court held that use of a monitoring device similar to that used in
Knotts did violate a “justifiable interest in . . . privacy” when police tracked
movements within a private residence which were not visible to the outside.
70. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
71. Id. at 213. The Court identified the issue as “whether naked-eye
observation of the curtilage by police from an aircraft lawfully operating at an
altitude of 1,000 feet violates an expectation of privacy that is reasonable.” Id.
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Court quoted the “knowing exposure” language of Katz72 and
found that respondent had essentially assumed the risk that
the marijuana might be observed by “[a]ny member of the
public flying in [the] airspace” above his yard.73 Thus, even
though respondent harbored a subjective expectation of
privacy in his yard,74 an “expectation that his garden was
protected from [aerial] observation [was] unreasonable.”75
72. Id.; see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
73. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14. Four dissenters in Ciraolo objected to the
majority’s assumption of risk analysis, noting: “The risk that a passenger on [a
commercial flight] might observe private activities, and might connect those
activities to particular people, is simply too trivial to protect against.” Id. at 22324. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, “people do not knowingly expose their
residential yards to the public merely by failing to build barriers that prevent
aerial surveillance.” Id. at 224 (internal quotation marks omitted). Noting the
majority’s failure to appreciate the “qualitative difference” between police
surveillance and other uses made of airspace, the dissenters observed:
Members of the public use the airspace for travel, business, or pleasure,
not for the purpose of observing activities taking place within residential
yards. Here, police conducted an overflight at low altitude solely for the
purpose of discovering evidence of crime within a private enclave into
which they were constitutionally forbidden to intrude at ground level
without a warrant. It is not easy to believe that our society is prepared
to force individuals to bear the risk of this type of warrantless police
intrusion into their residential areas.
Id. at 224-25.
74. The Court found that respondent “clearly—and understandably . . .
manifested his own subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy by placing
the fence to conceal street-level views of his property. Id. at 211.
75. Id. at 213-14. In another aerial surveillance case, Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445, 448-50 (1989), the Court found no Fourth Amendment search when police
observed marijuana growing in Riley’s greenhouse while flying in a helicopter
above Riley’s land. Again citing the Katz knowing exposure language, a fourJustice plurality concluded that “it is unreasonable . . . to expect that [the]
marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being observed with the
naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet[,]” thus rendering it unreasonable for
Riley to “have expected the contents of his greenhouse to be immune from
examination by [the] officer.” Id. at 449-50. Curiously, the plurality observed that
“no intimate details connected with the use of the home . . . were observed,” id. at
452, as if Riley would somehow not have assumed the risk of such observation
had it occurred.
Three dissenters in Riley objected to the plurality’s assumption of risk analysis:
“To say that an invasion of Riley’s privacy from the skies was not impossible is
most emphatically not the same as saying that his expectation of privacy within
his . . . curtilage was not ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’”

2014]

REDISCOVERING TRESPASS

1043

Finally, in Oliver v. United States,76 the Court found no
Fourth Amendment intrusion when drug enforcement
officials disregarded a “No Trespassing” sign and discovered
marijuana growing on petitioner’s farmland over a mile from
his home.77 The Court again employed assumption of risk
analysis in denying that the intrusion into the petitioner’s
“open fields”78 constituted a Fourth Amendment search.
“[A]ctivities . . . that occur in open fields . . . are accessible to
the public and the police . . . . It is not generally true that
fences or ‘No Trespassing’ signs effectively bar the
public . . . .”79 Moreover, the petitioner admittedly assumed
the risk that his land could be lawfully surveyed from the
air.80 Therefore, “the asserted expectation of privacy in open
fields is not an expectation that society recognizes as
reasonable.”81
2. Sharing with Another as Sharing with the World. In a
similar line of cases reflecting what is often characterized as
“the third party doctrine,”82 the Supreme Court has held that
Id. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
76. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
77. Oliver had placed the sign on a locked gate to his farmland. The officials
followed a footpath, which led around one side of the gate, walking through woods
several hundred yards along the edge of Oliver’s farm before observing two
marijuana patches fenced with chicken wire. Id. at 173-74.
78. The “open fields” doctrine permits police officers to enter and search a field
without a warrant. Id. at 173. Open fields, unlike the curtilage area immediately
associated with dwellings, are neither “houses” nor “effects” within the language
of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 176-80. This remains true even if the officers
trespassed upon the landowner’s land. Id. at 183. Disregarding “no trespassing”
signs on open fields does, however, constitute a trespass. Id. at 190-91 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 179 (majority opinion).
80. See id.
81. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Justices Marshall, Brennan, and
Stevens argued in dissent: “Private land marked in a fashion sufficient to render
entry thereon a criminal trespass under the law of the [s]tate in which the land
lies is protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . .” Id. at 195.
82. See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 36, at 320; Sobel et al., supra note 47, at 25.
Justice Sotomayor so describes the doctrine in her concurring opinion in Jones.
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring);
see also infra text accompanying note 175.
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when one voluntarily “reveals private information to
another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal
that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of
that information.”83 This is true, “even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party
will not be betrayed.”84 Thus, in California v. Greenwood,85
Greenwood left his garbage in opaque plastic bags on the
street for trash collectors to pick up, only to discover that the
bags were later turned over to police at their request86 and
opened, revealing their contents.87 The Court found the police
intrusion was not a search because, by knowingly exposing
the bags to third-party trash collectors, Greenwood assumed
the risk that the bags would be opened and their contents
revealed.88 As the Court explained, “[i]t is common knowledge
that plastic garbage bags left on . . . a public street are readily
accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public.”89 Thus, Greenwood possessed no

83. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984). In Jacobsen, private
parties opened a package inadvertently damaged, discovered white powder
therein, repackaged the parcel, and notified drug officials who subsequently
reopened the package without a warrant. Id. at 111. The Court held the police
intrusion did not violate an expectation of privacy since such expectation had
already been violated by the private worker’s intrusion. Id. at 118.
84. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (holding no Fourth
Amendment safeguards required when government obtains a person’s bank
records because she has no reasonable expectation in such records since she
knows several third parties will see any check she writes).
85. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
86. Id. at 37. The police had received a tip from an informant that Greenwood
might be engaged in narcotics trafficking. Responding to the tip, the police
requested the trash collectors to separate Greenwood’s garbage and deliver it to
them. Id.
87. Upon opening the bag, the police discovered items indicative of drug use,
which were used to obtain a warrant to search Greenwood’s house, which, upon
execution, turned up quantities of cocaine and hashish later admitted in evidence
against Greenwood. Id. at 37-38.
88. Id. at 40-41.
89. Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted).
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reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the bags90
under the Katz principle that what one “knowingly exposes
to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”91
The Court expressed the same idea in Smith v.
Maryland,92 holding that when one willingly allows a
telephone company access to the numbers dialed from her
phone, she allows the police similar access.93 By using the
phone, she voluntarily conveys numerical information,
including phone numbers dialed to the phone company, thus

90. Id. at 40-41. The Court appeared to grant, however, that Greenwood
possessed a subjective expectation of privacy because he “did not expect . . . the
contents of [the] garbage bags [to] become known to the police or other members
of the public.” Id. at 39.
91. Id. at 41 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). Justices
Brennan and Marshall countered the Court’s assumption of risk analysis:
The mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open and rummage
through the containers does not negate the expectation of privacy in their
contents any more than the possibility of a burglary negates an
expectation of privacy in the home; or the possibility of a private
intrusion negates an expectation of privacy in an unopened package; or
the possibility that an operator will listen in on a telephone conversation
negates an expectation of privacy in the words spoken on the
telephone. . . .
. . . [E]ven the voluntary relinquishment of possession or control over an
effect does not necessarily amount to a relinquishment of a privacy
expectation in it. Were it otherwise, a letter or package would lose all
Fourth Amendment protection when placed in a mailbox or other
depository with the express purpose of entrusting it to the postal officer
or a private carrier; those bailees are just as likely as trash collectors
(and certainly have greater incentive) to sort through the personal effects
entrusted to them, or permit others, such as police to do so. Yet, it has
been clear for at least 110 years that the possibility of such an intrusion
does not justify a warrantless search by police in the first instance.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 54-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
92. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
93. Id. at 744-45. In Smith, the police requested the telephone company install
a pen register on Smith’s phone, suspecting that he was making threatening
phone calls to a robbery victim. The pen register recorded phone numbers dialed
on Smith’s phone, some of which were made to the victim. Id. at 737.
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“expos[ing]” such information.94 In doing so one “assume[s]
the risk that the company [will] reveal to the police the
numbers [she] dialed.”95 Such risk would clearly be assumed
had calls been made through an operator.96 The Court
deemed the situation no different when the dialing
information was obtained electronically, as was the case in
Smith.97 While Smith might have possessed a subjective
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed,98 his
expectation was not reasonable because he assumed the risk
that the police might obtain the numbers.99 Therefore, the
installation of the pen register did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search.100
In a final example, the Court in United States v. White101
reaffirmed pre-Katz cases holding that when one shares
information with another she assumes the risk that the
confidant will divulge the information to the police,102 or even
94. Id. at 744. The Court noted: “Telephone users typically know . . . that they
must convey numerical information to the phone company for [billing purposes];
that the phone company has facilities for recording this information; and that the
phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate
business purposes.” Id. at 743.
95. Id. at 744.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 744-45.
98. Id. at 745.
99. Id. The Court used the terms “legitimate” and “reasonable” as equivalent.
Id. at 740, 745.
100. Id. at 745-46. Justices Marshall and Brennan again objected to the
majority’s assumption of risk analysis:
The Court concludes that because individuals have no actual or
legitimate expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily
relinquish to telephone companies, the use of pen registers by
government agents is immune from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Since
I remain convinced that constitutional protections are not abrogated
whenever a person apprises another of facts valuable in criminal
investigations . . . I respectfully dissent.
Id. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
102. Id. at 749. Katz did not indicate in any way that “a defendant has
a . . . constitutionally protected expectation that a person with whom he is
conversing will not then or later reveal the conversation to the police.” Id.

2014]

REDISCOVERING TRESPASS

1047

that the confidant might in fact be an undercover police
agent.103 In White, police agents monitored and overheard
conversations between White and Jackson, an undercover
police operative, by means of a radio transmitter concealed
on Jackson’s person, unbeknownst to White.104 The police
agents testified as to the incriminating nature of the
conversations at White’s trial, over his objection that the
method of monitoring the statements violated the Fourth
Amendment.105 The White Court found no violation because
White had no protected expectation of privacy that Jackson
would not reveal the conversations to the police.106 It made no
difference that the police were themselves listening to the
conversations. “If the law gives no protection to the
wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police
agent, neither should it protect him when that same agent
has recorded or transmitted the conversations which are
later offered in evidence to prove the State’s case.”107 In the
Court’s eyes, “one contemplating illegal activities must
realize [the] risk that his companions may be reporting to the
police.”108 The wrongdoer’s “misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal
it”109 is no defense to the risk of revelation.110 Thus, however
private White might have subjectively expected his
conversations to be, such expectations were not reasonable

103. Id. Katz left unaffected earlier cases, id. at 749, where the Court found no
constitutional violations when government agents secretly befriended a suspect
to gather incriminating evidence, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966);
where the government sent a secret agent to a suspect’s home to purchase
narcotics, Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); and where secret agents
carried hidden recording devices to gather evidence from a suspect, Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
104. White, 401 U.S. at 746-47.
105. Id. at 747.
106. Id. at 749.
107. Id. at 752 (citing Lopez, 373 U.S. at 430).
108. Id. at 752.
109. Id. at 749 (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)).
110. Id. at 751.
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because he assumed the risk that the conversations would be,
or were being, revealed.111
C. Criticism of the Assumption of Risk Approach
As illustrated by Justice Harlan’s rejection of his own
expectation of privacy formulation,112 and by dissenting
opinions of other justices raising similar objections,113 the
Court’s atomistic assumption of risk approach is extremely
controversial.114 A host of commentators have voiced
disapproval. Some have criticized the Court for being
“sting[y] in finding a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy[,]’”
seeing the Katz regime as “a sword for the government, not a
shield of personal privacy.”115 Others see the expectation of
privacy formula as “destr[uctive of] Katz and most of [its]
substance.”116 In an age of technology, critics view Katz as
particularly inadequate,117 leading to the conclusion that “the
reasonable expectation of privacy test cannot be
resuscitated.”118
The third-party doctrine has come under particular
fire.119 One critic voiced his concerns this way:

111. Id. at 751-52. As noted earlier, Justice Harlan strongly objected to the
Court’s assumption of risk analysis. See supra text accompanying note 59.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
113. See supra notes 73, 75, 81, 91, & 100.
114. I have earlier noted problems with the atomistic view and the possible need
for a regulatory approach in the context of dogs sniffing school students for drugs
while the students sat in their classrooms. See Martin R. Gardner, Sniffing for
Drugs in the Classroom—Perspectives on Fourth Amendment Scope, 74 NW. U. L.
REV. 803, 827, 845 (1980).
115. Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz., 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 907,
910 (2004).
116. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 383.
117. See Sobel et al., supra note 47, at 33.
118. Solove, Pragmatism, supra note 26, at 1521.
119. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561,
563-64 (2009) [hereinafter Kerr, Third-Party] (“The third-party doctrine is the
Fourth Amendment rule scholars love to hate. . . . The verdict among
commentators has been frequent and apparently unanimous: the third-party
doctrine is not only wrong, but horribly wrong.”). For a sample of articles and
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Exposure of privacies to limited, chosen members of the public
should not preclude fourth amendment protection if governmental
actions intrude to a greater degree than those members of the
public to whom such privacies knowingly have been
exposed. . . . One of the essential components of privacy . . . is not
solitude but the ability to choose those with whom to share business
or personal intimacies. Therefore, it is not the voluntary exposure
of intimacies to chosen members of the public that destroys privacy;
rather, it is uninvited governmental intrusion that destroys privacy
by destroying that freedom of choice.120

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, there exists no
principled basis to prevent the assumption of risk approach
from swallowing any and all privacy protection. As one
observer noted, the assumption of risk approach “ha[s]
steadily eroded privacy in specific cases, and conceptually
promise[s] to eliminate it altogether, because [it] does not
admit of any logical stopping point.”121 After all, if, as in Riley,
one assumes the risk of the police flying over his greenhouse
and observing marijuana growing therein,122 why would he
not similarly assume the risk of police observing “intimate”
activity transpiring in the greenhouse123 or, for that matter,
intimacies observed through a bathroom’s sunroof as police
fly over one’s home? If, as in Greenwood, one assumes the risk
of the police perusing his garbage, does he not similarly
assume the risk that government officials will reassemble

books criticizing the doctrine, the whole of which in Professor Kerr’s opinion
would constitute “the world’s longest law review footnote,” see id. at 563 n.5.
120. Serr, supra note 62, at 635-36.
121. Colb, supra note 55, at 121. Of course, the Court has not in fact followed
the assumption of risk approach to its logical conclusions. See, e.g., Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968), where the Court granted standing to DeForte
to contest the warrantless search of an office he shared with several others. While
DeForte no doubt assumed the risk that one of the others might consent to a
search of the office, the Court nevertheless recognized the intrusion as a “search”
vis a vis DeForte because he possessed “a reasonable expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion” under Katz. Id. at 368-69. Note that DeForte represented
a “standing” case at a time prior to the Court’s merger of “standing” and “search
and seizure” issues into a single inquiry. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 13234 (1978).
122. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989).
123. Id. at 452.
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documents he has shredded and placed in garbage bags to be
collected for disposal?124
In short, the logic of the assumption of risk approach
reduces privacy to secrecy. If sharing information with
another means sharing it with the world, including the
government, we can be assured of privacy only by keeping our
affairs secret—simply not involving others in our lives.
However, any meaningful sense of privacy must be
understood as the power to share intimacies with some while
excluding others.125 One commentator put it this way:
[O]rdinary patterns of human behavior embody shared privacies.
That is, people are embedded in relationships and they act as if they
expect those relationships to be respected by others. . . . [S]hared
privacy is invaluable. We need to be able safely to share with others
to become fully human. We further need to be able to create
enclaves from the world at large in which we can be with our chosen
intimates.126

The Court’s assumption of risk theory, premised as it is
on an atomistic view of privacy,127 disregards the importance
of intimacy and interconnectedness.128 The doctrine has been
extended by some lower courts to hold that the mere
possibility of third-party consent, inherent in shared access,
is sufficient to eliminate the defendant’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.129 Such cases leave little room for any
124. At least one lower court has answered affirmatively. See United States v.
Scott, 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding IRS agents did not conduct Fourth
Amendment search by reassembling shredded documents in garbage).
125. Justice Douglas noted:
[E]very individual needs both to communicate with others and to keep
his affairs to himself. That dual aspect of privacy means that the
individual should have the freedom to select for himself the time and
circumstances when he will share his secrets with others and decide the
extent of that sharing.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
126. Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights
of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1596 (1987).
127. See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
128. Coombs, supra note 126, at 1635.
129. Id. at 1649 (discussing cases).
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coherent protection of privacy:
Clearly, merely sharing with persons whom we ordinarily expect to
protect our interests ought not be equated with losing all
expectations of privacy. Sharing does mean accepting the risk that
others may exercise their autonomy and choose, in a particular
instance, to consent. There is thus a sense in which one who shares
“assumes the risk” inherent in the unpredictability of human
beings. Too many courts, however, seem ready to convert this
“assumption of the risk” into a battering ram by which the
government may freely invade any place in which human
interaction occurs. Neither as a matter of description nor
prescription does it makes sense to treat betrayal by our friends as
the norm.130

II. AUGMENTING THE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY TEST:
KYLLO, THE REBIRTH OF TRESPASS, AND THE SEEDS OF A
REGULATORY APPROACH
As discussed immediately below, the limitations of the
Katz expectation of privacy standard seemingly have not
gone unnoticed by the Supreme Court. However, rather than
simply replacing the Katz expectation of privacy emphasis,
the Court has chosen to supplement that approach by
reinvigorating the trespass to property standard which had
lain dormant since the appearance of Katz.
There is reason to believe, however, that even expanded
protections of both privacy and property will prove
inadequate as grounds for defining an acceptable scope of the
Fourth Amendment in the age of technology.131 Indeed, the
emergence of the Court’s trespass cases, along with its earlier
seminal decision in Kyllo,132 indicates that the Court may be
moving towards explicit recognition of a regulatory standard
as a third alternative to the atomistic approaches entailed
respectively in the privacy and trespass to property
approaches. This Part examines the indications of the
eventual emergence of a regulatory orientation.

130. Id. at 1649-50.
131. See infra notes 145, 172-77 and accompanying text.
132. Kyllo is discussed in detail infra notes 133-54 and accompanying text.
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A. Kyllo
Kyllo v. United States133 represents the first evidence that
the Court may be moving away from the Katz expectation of
privacy approach as the sole means of defining Fourth
Amendment searches. Indeed, Kyllo has been described as a
case reflecting “the Court’s own discomfort” with the
assumption of risk doctrine while at the same time
expressing attraction to a regulatory, “norm transgression”
view.134
In Kyllo, the Court found a Fourth Amendment search
where police employed a thermal imaging device to detect
heat patterns emanating from Danny Kyllo’s house, in which
they suspected marijuana plants were being grown.135 The
police, situated in a police vehicle across the street from
Kyllo’s house, engaged the scanning device for only a few
minutes.136 The device revealed heat imaging patterns
consistent with the use of high-intensity lamps associated
with the cultivation of marijuana growth.137 The images
provided support for a warrant, the execution of which
resulted in the seizure of marijuana plants from the house.138
The Kyllo Court reiterated the longstanding view that
Fourth Amendment rights had been “decoupled . . . from
trespassory violation[s] of . . . property”139 but hinted at a
possible reemergence of a property-oriented test by noting
that sufficient grounds for searches exist “if there is an
‘actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.’”140
While visual observations are themselves non-searches,141 the
Court found that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology
any information regarding the interior of the home that could
133. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
134. Colb, supra note 55, at 123-24.
135. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
136. Id. at 30.
137. Id. at 29-30.
138. Id. at 30.
139. Id. at 32.
140. Id. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1960)).
141. Id. at 32.

2014]

REDISCOVERING TRESPASS

1053

not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search—
at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in
general public use.”142
Such a view recognizes the interior of homes as the
“prototypical . . . area of protected privacy.”143 Responding to
the claim that the imaging device detected only public heat
radiating from the exterior of the house,144 the Court found
that such a position would “leave the homeowner at the
mercy of advancing technology[,]” which might eventually
access details within the home, an area held safe from
“prying government eyes.”145 Granting that perhaps only a
minimal privacy intrusion occurred in Kyllo,146 the Court
nevertheless insisted on taking the “long view” of the Fourth
Amendment from its original meaning forward.147
Curiously, however, the Court intimated that if the
thermal imaging procedure utilized in Kyllo had been in
“general public use,” it might not have constituted a search.148
142. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512).
143. Id. at 34.
144. Id. at 35. A dissenting opinion in Kyllo argued that the device did not reveal
information regarding the interior of the home, contrary to the majority’s view
that the device revealed the relative heat of various rooms in the home. Id. at 34
n.2.
145. Id. at 35, 37.
146. While conceding that “it is certainly possible to conclude . . . that no
‘significant’ compromise of [Kyllo’s] privacy [ ] occurred” through the use of the
thermal imaging device, id. at 40, the Court nevertheless observed that “any
physical invasion of the structure of the home ‘by even a fraction of an inch’ [is]
too much.” Id. at 37 (quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512). The Court thus rejected
any de minimis argument, maintaining that there exists no constitutional
difference between “intimate” and “nonintimate” matters within the home. Id. at
37 (“In the home . . . all details are intimate details because the entire area is held
safe. . . .”). The Court went on to suggest that the detection device used in Kyllo
might actually reveal “intimate” details of home life such as “at what hour each
night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath.” Id. at 38.
Commentators have suggested that the Kyllo Court “stretched the reasonableexpectation test to suit its purpose of upholding increased privacy protections for
the interior of the home.” Sobel et al., supra note 47, at 29.
147. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
148. See supra note 142 and accompanying text; see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.

1054

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

Such dicta appears to be an attempt to distinguish Kyllo from
the Court’s assumption of risk cases,149 thus preserving the
continued viability of those cases. If so, the upshot of Kyllo is
that while the police invaded Kyllo’s privacy by means of the
thermal imaging device, they would not have done so if the
general public, and presumably also the government,
routinely used the device. Under such circumstances,
apparently no Fourth Amendment consequences would
follow if the police subjected the entire public to the intrusion
at issue in Kyllo. If so, wholesale governmental incursions
into the lives of the public are no more likely to constitute
“unreasonable” invasions of privacy than the one-time action
in Kyllo.
To avoid this anomaly, some have suggested that Kyllo is
not really a Katz reasonable expectation of privacy case at all,
but rather a common law trespass case.150 Thus, as a
precursor to the Jones and Jardines trespass cases, “[i]f use
of a thermal imaging device was a search because it was a
common law trespass, then presumably it should stay a
149. As Professor Colb has observed, the Kyllo Court attempted to distinguish
assumption of risk cases such as Knotts, Ciraolo, Riley, Oliver, and Greenwood.
See Colb, supra note 55, at 169; see also supra notes 65-91 and accompanying text.
The Kyllo Court distinguished Ciraolo and Riley on the ground that “thermal
imaging is a special technology to which few people have access, in contrast to
airplanes and helicopters, which are routinely used by the public.” Colb, supra
note 55, at 169. Thus, Kyllo did not assume the risk of his home being invaded by
thermal imaging technology, while citizens subjected to intrusions by means of
planes and helicopters do assume the risk of such intrusions. The Kyllo Court
distinguished Greenwood and Oliver on the ground that no technology was used
in those cases at all. Id. Unlike those cases, Kyllo involved “more than naked-eye
surveillance of a home.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
For detailed discussion of the relevance of whether a surveillance procedure is “in
general use” or not, see Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the
Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological
Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1398-1411 (2002).
150. See Orin Kerr, Three Questions Raised by the Trespass Test in United
States v. Jones, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2012, 6:57 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/01/23/three-questions-raised-by-the-trespass-testin-united-states-v-jones [hereinafter Kerr, Three Questions]; see also Kerr, Fourth
Amendment, supra note 8, at 832 (arguing Kyllo reinforces the “primacy of
property law” as a “traditional goal of property protection in the home”); Radsan,
supra note 8, at 1482 (arguing Kyllo Court influenced by pre-Katz era’s emphasis
on trespass).
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search regardless of how common thermal imaging devices
may be.”151
Nevertheless, the Kyllo Court did not explicitly ground
its decision on an invasion of Kyllo’s property rights. Neither
did it identify a significant encroachment of privacy under
Katz. Yet the Court still found a Fourth Amendment search,
a finding seemingly less concerned with protecting Kyllo’s
atomistic property or privacy rights than with regulating
future governmental use of increasingly sophisticated
technology deemed threatening to general Fourth
Amendment interests.152 In explaining its “long view,”153 the
Court quoted an early case, observing that the “Fourth
Amendment is to be construed in . . . a manner which will
conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights
of individual citizens.”154 Conserving “public interests” could
conceivably entail regulating governmental practices
offending Fourth Amendment values even where no
particular atomistic interests are at stake.
If Kyllo does not itself represent a regulatory approach to
defining Fourth Amendment searches, it at least evidences a
significant nod in that direction. Following Kyllo’s lead, the
recent trespass cases, Jones and Jardines, reflect a similar
movement.
B. The Trespass Cases
1. Jones. United States v. Jones155 addressed the

151. Kerr, Three Questions, supra note 150.
152. While conceding that the technology employed in the instant case was
“relatively crude,” the Kyllo Court nevertheless worried that advancing thermal
imaging technology could eventually discern all human activity in the home.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36. Thus, the Court felt it necessary that the rule adopted
in Kyllo “take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development.” Id. at 36.
153. See supra text accompanying note 147.
154. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149
(1925)).
155. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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constitutionality of a warrantless156 attachment of a GPS
tracking device by law enforcement agents to the
undercarriage of a vehicle parked in a public parking lot.
Possessing a bailment interest in the vehicle,157 Jones
complained
that
the
subsequent
twenty-eight-day
governmental monitoring of the vehicle as it travelled on
public streets constituted an unreasonable search, rendering
evidence obtained through the monitoring inadmissible.158
The Court agreed, holding that the installation of the device
and its use to monitor the vehicle’s movements constituted a
Fourth Amendment search because the government
“physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information.”159 Hearkening back to historical
understandings, the Court found that Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence continued to be “tied to common-law
trespass,”160 even though Jones may not have possessed a
reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz.161 His property
interest in the vehicle, an “effect” under the Fourth
Amendment, entitled him to be free from a governmental
trespass upon that protected area.162 “Where, as here, the
Government obtains information by physically intruding on
a constitutionally protected area, . . . a search has

156. Although governmental agents obtained a warrant authorizing the use of
a GPS tracking device on the car at issue in Jones, the agents failed to comply
with the warrant’s time and place requirements, rendering the eventual
placement of the GPS device on the car a warrantless intrusion. Id. at 948-49.
157. The vehicle was registered to Jones’s wife, but Jones was its exclusive
driver and thus functioned as a bailee. Id. at 949 n.2.
158. See id. at 948-49.
159. Id. at 949.
160. Id.
161. While the Government argued that no expectation of privacy was violated
through its utilization of the GPS device, the Court saw no need to address such
contentions since “Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights d[id] not rise or fall with the
Katz formulation.” Id. at 947. Katz and its progeny never abandoned the
traditional understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies “a particular
concern for government trespass upon areas [persons, houses, papers, and effects]
it enumerates.” Id.
162. Id. at 949. The Court found that by “attaching the [GPS] device to the
[vehicle], officers encroached on a protected area.” Id. at 952.
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undoubtedly occurred.”163 The Court made clear, however,
that a mere trespass qualifies as a search only where a
government agent “attempt[s] to find something or to obtain
information.”164 Finally, the Court specified that the trespass
test operates as a supplement to the Katz privacy test and
not as its replacement.165
Jones is significant for several reasons,166 not the least of
which is that it represents the Court’s willingness to expand
163. Id. at 950 n.3. The Court distinguished Knotts, see supra notes 65-69 and
accompanying text, by noting that the beeper in that case had been placed in the
container with the consent of the then-owner before it came into Knotts’s
possession. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952. Therefore, there was no trespass to Knotts’s
property. Id.
164. Id. at 951 n.5.
165. Id. at 952 (finding the Katz test “has been added to, not substituted for, the
common-law trespassory test.”) (italics in original).
Justice Alito and three other members of the Court concurred in the majority’s
decision that the GPS monitoring constituted a search, but grounded their finding
in the Katz rubric, seeing the “lengthy” tracking of the vehicle’s movements as
violating Jones’s reasonable expectations of privacy. Id. at 964. These Justices
objected to the majority’s utilization of the trespass approach, seeing it as totally
rejected by Katz, which is, in their eyes, the sole basis for defining Fourth
Amendment searches. Id. at 959-60.
166. One commentator concludes:
[Jones as] a more explicit focus on property rights as an objective proxy
for privacy expectations has the potential to diminish the subjectivity
and circularity currently plaguing Fourth Amendment analysis. Over
time, especially if trespass to chattels is considered a search, Jones may
cover most of the territory currently protected by Katz and could
ultimately replace Katz as a clearer, cleaner metric of when the Fourth
Amendment is implicated.
Erica Goldberg, How United States v. Jones Can Restore Our Faith in the Fourth
Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 68-69 (2011),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/Goldberg.pdf.
Another added:
Jones represents a logical addition to the current Fourth Amendment
analysis. First, the Fourth Amendment was given proper deference by
the entire Court. Second, the Court revitalized a historic attribute of the
Fourth Amendment, trespass, that had lain largely moribund during the
checkered reign of Katz. Third, the Court retained such value as Katz
may have in avoiding the procedural pitfalls of the trespass doctrine.
Arnold H. Loewy, United States v. Jones, Return to Trespass—Good News or Bad,
82 MISS. L.J. 879, 888 (2013).
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the universe of analytical vehicles available to define Fourth
Amendment searches. No longer are searches determined
solely in terms of the inquiry into reasonable expectations of
privacy.
Moreover, Jones shifts attention from an exclusive focus
on the interests of the citizen searched to also include a
consideration of the state of mind of the government actor.
Like Katz, the Jones trespass doctrine is on its face a formula
requiring infringement of atomistic rights of the citizen—
privacy rights in Katz, property rights in Jones. But Jones
adds a further dimension requiring that governmental
intrusions must be accompanied by a particular motivation—
an intent “to find something or to obtain evidence.”167
Searches under Katz, on the other hand, require no such
particular state of mind on the part of government officials,168
but occur whenever governmental intrusions disrupt
“reasonable expectations” of privacy.169 Thus, for example,
police officers entering homes without warrants to aid or
assist those inside are “searching” under Katz, and are thus
subject to Fourth Amendment reasonableness,170 even though
such intrusions would not constitute searches under Jones
167. Prior to Jones, some lower courts had adopted a similar requirement. See,
e.g., United States v. Maple, 334 F.3d 15, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding, without
specifically mentioning the trespass approach, that no search occurred because a
police officer “was not looking for ‘something’” when the officer, attempting to
secure a motor vehicle and its contents after arresting the vehicle’s driver, opened
a compartment in the center console of the vehicle in order to hide the arrestee’s
cell phone from public view). This conclusion was controversial to a dissenter who
criticized the majority’s “novel notion” that the officer’s subjective intent was
relevant in determining whether a search occurred. Id. at 22-23 (Rogers, J.,
dissenting). Ultimately, however, the dissenting opinion prevailed on rehearing.
See United States v. Maple, 348 F.3d 260, 263 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“‘the issue is not’
the law enforcement officer’s ‘state of mind’—whether he was intentionally
rummaging about for contraband or wished to find something in particular—‘but
the objective effect of his actions’—whether a reasonable expectation of privacy
was infringed.”) (quoting Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000)).
168. The Court, in an early case, did suggest, however, that “a search ordinarily
implies a quest by an officer of the law.” Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
169. See supra notes 36-111 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Roberts v. Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 906 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding
a police officer acted reasonably under Fourth Amendment when he entered
citizen’s home believing he was preventing the citizen’s suicide).
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for want of an intent “to find something or to obtain
evidence.” This redirected focus in Jones away from an
inquiry exclusively centered on atomistic rights towards an
additional examination into how the government acts, and
with what state of mind its actors possess, plants the seed for
a standard couched exclusively in terms of regulating
governmental overreach as a third alternative to the present
atomistic privacy and property rights tests.171
Proponents of a regulatory test see its necessity in light
of issues left unaddressed in Jones—such as the “unique
attributes of GPS surveillance . . . [which] require particular
attention,”172—as noted by Justice Sotomayor in her Jones
concurrence:
171. One commentator has argued that “given contemporary realities regarding
technology and social norms” unaddressed by Jones, the time has come for the
Court to make “a reasoned normative pronouncement” to deal with the
“inadequately theorized area of contemporary electronic surveillance.” Caren
Myers Morrison, The Drug Dealer, the Narc, and the Very Tiny Constable:
Reflections on United States v. Jones, 3 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 113, 114 (2012),
http://www.californialawreview.org/assets/circuit/Morrison_3-113.pdf.
Professor Thomas Clancy has called for a new “normative, liberal approach to
interpreting the [Fourth] Amendment” in the modern era:
The inquiry must examine the essence of what the Amendment seeks to
protect: the right to be secure—that is, the ability to exclude the
government from prying.
In today’s society, technological and other advances preclude the ability
to shield anything absolutely. To adequately protect and give recognition
to the ability to exclude, normative values must be employed. Do the
precautions taken by the person objectively evidence an intent to exclude
the human senses? Does the particular surveillance technique utilized
by the government defeat the individual’s right to exclude? Would the
spirit motivating the framers of the Amendment abhor these new devices
no less than the direct and obvious methods of oppression that inspired
the Fourth Amendment? The answer to those questions is always a value
judgment.
Clancy, supra note 36, at 318-19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In addition to Professor Clancy’s regulatory approach, see the normative
regulatory standard at supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. See also infra
notes 204-05 and accompanying text. See infra notes 227-35 and accompanying
text for an argument that the regulatory test should, and likely will, augment
rather than replace the Katz and Jones approaches.
172. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring). For commentary suggesting the inadequacies of both Katz and Jones
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GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her
familial,
political,
professional,
religious,
and
sexual
associations. . . . The Government can store such records and
efficiently mine them for information years into the
future. . . . Awareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms. . . . I would take these
attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the
existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum
of one’s public movements. I would ask whether people reasonably
expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a
manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at
will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on. 173

In recognizing that much GPS monitoring can occur
without a trespass to property,174 thus excluding such cases
from the purview of Jones, Justice Sotomayor suggested
expanding the recognition of searches under Katz, arguing
that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”175 Indeed,
in discussing satellite imaging technology, one commentator
noted: “[t]he combined caselaw that permits law enforcement
to examine curtilage from navigable airspace; to monitor
one’s movements on public thoroughfares; and to accept
to address Fourth Amendment problems posed by modern technology, see infra
notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
173. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Justice Sotomayor quoted People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 441-42 (2009):
Disclosed in GPS data will be trips the indisputably private nature of
which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the
plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip
club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union
meeting, the mosque synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (alterations omitted).
174. Justice Sotomayor noted: “the Government will be capable of duplicating
the monitoring undertaken in [Jones] by enlisting factory- or owner-installed
vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.” Id.
175. Id. at 957. Some commentators agree. See, e.g., Kathryn Nobuko Horwath,
A Check-in on Privacy After United States v. Jones: Current Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence in the Context of Location-Based Applications and Services, 40
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 948 (2013) (The “third-party doctrine must be
circumscribed to reflect evolving technological realities.”).
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information disclosed to third parties (Third Party Doctrine)
initially suggests that government use of satellite imaging
technology may be without constitutional significance.”176
Such considerations have led many to criticize Jones for
failing to embrace a regulatory test thought necessary to deal
with a host of difficult issues created by modern technology
which are not adequately addressed by either the Katz
privacy expectation formula or the Jones trespass
approach.177
2. Jardines. Citing Jones, the Court saw the dog sniff as
a “straightforward” example of a physical intrusion of the
curtilage of the house, thus constituting a search “within the
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”178 While
granting that police officers, like ordinary citizens, possess
an implied license to approach a home and knock on its door,
the Court nevertheless found that the police were not
licensed to enter Jardines’s porch for “[the] purpose [of]
conduct[ing] a search.”179 Thus, the “use of trained police dogs
to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings
[constituted] a [Fourth Amendment search].”180
As in Jones, the Jardines Court saw no need to assess the
dog sniff under Katz, observing that “[o]ne virtue of
the . . . property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases
easy.”181 For the Court, it was enough that the police learned
176. Mary G. Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones:
Commercial Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post-Google Earth
World, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331, 353 (2012).
177. See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 36, at 322 (Jones fails to give “guidance [or]
any coherent framework” for addressing “new technologies”); Susan Freiwald,
The Davis Good Faith Rule and Getting Answers to the Questions Jones Left Open,
14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 341, 346 (“[V]ery few courts are answering . . . the questions
raised by . . . Jones”); Horwath, supra note 175, at 934 (Jones “sidestepped the
larger issue” of whether the GPS monitoring violated reasonable privacy
expectations); Leary, supra note 176, at 333 (Jones “fails to keep current with
technology”); Morrison, supra note 171, at 123 (Jones Court “refus[ed] to engage
with any of the thorny but nonetheless pressing issues raised by new technology”).
178. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at
950 n.3) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417-18.
180. Id. at 1417-18.
181. Id. at 1417.
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what they learned “only by physically intruding on
Jardines’[s] property to gather evidence.”182
Justice Alito and three other dissenters saw no search
under either the Katz or the trespass approaches.183 Alito
found no search under Katz and its assumption of risk
doctrine because Jardines would, as a “reasonable person,”
understand that odors emanating from within his house
“may be detected from locations that are open to the public,”
and thus could not count on “the strength of those odors
remaining within the range that, while detectible by a dog,
cannot be smelled by a human.”184 Moreover, in finding no
trespass to Jardines’s property, Alito focused on the fact that
police officers not only possess a license to approach a house
and knock on its door, but also to do so for the purpose of
gathering evidence against the homeowner, even by asking
her incriminating questions when she responds to the
knock.185 Therefore, under this view of the majority opinion,
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1420, 1426 (Alito, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy and Breyer).
184. Id. at 1421.
185. Id. at 1420. The majority disagreed, arguing that the police license allows
them only to “speak with the occupant,” not to gather evidence against the
homeowner. Id. at 1416 n.4. If the police behavior “objectively reveals a purpose
to conduct a search,” the behavior is not licensed. Id. at 1417. Such a view appears
to beg the question—was there a “search”?—which the majority attempts to
define in terms of whether the officer intended to conduct a “search.”
Justice Alito responded to the majority’s points as follows:
The Court concludes that [the police] went too far because [they] had the
“objectiv[e] . . . purpose to conduct a search.” (emphasis added). What this
means, I take it, is that anyone aware of what [the police] did would infer
that [their] subjective purpose was to gather evidence. But if this is the
Court’s point, then a standard “knock and talk” and most other police
visits would likewise constitute searches. With the exception of visits to
serve warrants or civil process, police almost always approach homes
with a purpose of discovering information. That is certainly the objective
of a “knock and talk.” The Court offers no meaningful way of
distinguishing the “objective purpose” of [the police] conduct here. . . .
What the Court must fall back on, then, is the particular instrument that
[the police] used to detect the odor of marijuana, namely [their] dog. But
in the entire body of common-law decisions, the Court has not found a
single case holding that a visitor to the front door of a home commits a
trespass if the visitor is accompanied by a dog on a leash. On the
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the trespass in Jardines occurred only because the police
were accompanied by their dog during their otherwise lawful
visit to the front door of Jardines’s house.186 Finding no
authority for such a proposition, Alito concluded that
trespass law provides no support for the majority’s holding.187
If Justice Alito’s assessment of the majority opinion is
correct, significant Fourth Amendment questions arise.
What difference did it make to Jardines whether the police
entered his property with a dog or not? How was his quiet
enjoyment of his property affected by a dog being briefly on
his front porch?188 Was it really an infringement of Jardines’s
property rights that were at stake, or perhaps rather the
specter of what the police did, Jardines’s rights aside, that
was the problem? Seemingly it was the latter.
Again assuming that Justice Alito and his three
colleagues correctly assessed the Jardines majority opinion,
the case—while recognizing a technical invasion of atomistic
property interests—is best understood as an attempt to
regulate police misbehavior. Why, after all, would it be
permissible for the police to ask Jardines incriminating
questions from his porch but not if they have their dog with
them? The most plausible answer seems to be that the
presence of the dog, sniffing the house, sends a message to
Jardines’s neighbors, or anyone else passing by, that
Jardines is under police suspicion. The mere presence of the
police, even uniformed officers, on a person’s porch conveys
no necessary message of suspicion of the home’s occupants.
Indeed, such presence may well be viewed not as an attempt
to gather incriminating evidence against those in the home,
but rather to do such things as notify them of a family
member’s accident, or as an attempt to seek information
contrary, the common law allowed even unleashed dogs to wander on
private property without committing a trespass.
Id. at 1423-24 (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
186. See id. at 1420. The majority disagreed with this point, arguing that it was
the police behavior, and not the dog, that caused the problem, stating: “[The]
typical person would find it ‘a cause of great alarm’ to find a stranger snooping
about his front porch with or without a dog.” Id. at 1416 n.3 (emphasis in original).
187. See supra note 186.
188. The dog was on Jardines’s porch no more than “a minute or two.” Jardines,
133 S. Ct. at 1421.
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about whether suspicious persons have been seen in the
neighborhood, or as an inquiry into whether those in the
home know the whereabouts of a person of interest to the
police. On the other hand, when police direct a dog to sniff
particular property, they are usually looking for contraband
concealed therein. Thus understood, the evil presented by
Jardines was not that Jardines’s property, much his less
privacy, interests were threatened, but that the police
engaged in conduct that unjustifiably risked holding him up
to public ridicule. This view suggests that the essential
concern in Jardines was whether such police conduct, if
engaged in routinely without sufficient cause,189 would
improperly disparage the reputation of law abiding citizens
in the eyes of the public.190 By finding a search, the police
misconduct could be deterred.
If this indeed captures the gist of Jardines, the Court
has, perhaps for the first time, implicitly embraced a
normative, regulatory approach to defining Fourth
Amendment scope. If so, the constitutional mischief of an
189. The Jardines majority seemingly held that the search should have been
supported by a warrant: “[A] police officer not armed with a warrant may
approach a home and knock.” Id. at 1416. By negative implication, an officer
exceeding the scope of his license to approach a home must do so only with a
warrant.
190. Professor LaFave has argued such a proposition in connection with his
criticism of Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), a case holding that no search
occurred when police led drug-sniffing dogs around a car legally stopped for a
traffic violation:
Use of a drug dog on the vehicle of a motorist stopped for a traffic
violation is an accusatory act. . . . Use of a drug dog incident to a traffic
stop is likely to be humiliating to the driver of the vehicle, for such use
manifests police suspicion of the driver as a drug courier to all those who
may pass by while the scenario is being played out on the side of an
interstate highway or city street.
4 LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 546-47.
There was no evidence that anyone saw the police and their dog on Jardines’s
porch. Thus, Jardines himself did not experience the humiliation of an unjustified
public accusation. If such accusation is indeed the constitutional evil in Jardines,
the thrust of the opinion must be directed at protecting the general public from
such accusations in the future. In short, the opinion appears aimed at
regulating—deterring—this kind of governmental misconduct rather than
protecting the rights of any particular person.
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unsupported search seemingly occurs whenever the police
cast a public pall of suspicion upon a citizen without adequate
cause, whether or not the suspicion is associated with an
invasion of the atomistic property or privacy rights of a
particular person.
In the next Part of this Article, I formulize particular
language which I recommend the Court adopt if and when it
explicitly moves to a regulatory standard. I also discuss how
that standard relates to the present Katz and Jones/Jardines
standards.
III. A REGULATORY STANDARD: A THIRD ALTERNATIVE TO
ATOMISTIC PRIVACY AND PROPERTY APPROACHES
As shown above, the Supreme Court appears to be in the
process of adopting a regulatory approach to defining Fourth
Amendment searches and seizures in recognition of the fact
that current doctrine is ill-equipped to address threats posed
to privacy interests by advancing technology. For example, as
previously mentioned, GPS monitoring can occur without a
trespass to property, in cases of factory or owner-installed
vehicle tracking devices.191 Governmental access to
information provided by such devices would thus not
constitute a search under Jones, nor would it under Katz,
because, as in Knotts,192 one would assume the risk of being
ubiquitously observed when he or she travels in an
automobile on public thoroughfares.193 Of perhaps greater
concern, smart phone monitoring is potentially more invasive
than GPS vehicle tracking, given that people routinely carry
their phones on their persons at all times, and monitoring
can occur wherever the phone is located, both indoors and
outside.194 While government monitoring in the home would
constitute a search under Kyllo,195 tracking the movements of
191. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
194. Horwarth, supra note 175, at 945.
195. See supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text. Tracking the movements
of a mobile phone within a home would also appear to constitute a search under
Karo. See supra note 69.
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the phone and its possessor in other settings would appear to
be permissible—except where a trespass to property is
involved196—under the assumption of risk principles
articulated in Smith.197
In addition to problems created by satellite imaging,
technology allowing data mining through phone and internet
surveillance presents a threat to privacy. Governmental
acquisition of stored electronic communications from a
service provider would again likely be deemed a risk assumed
by the citizen communicator, thus negating any claim to a
violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy.198 Moreover,
under Smith, even wholesale collection of source and
destination information from all U.S. citizens, obtained from
phone and internet usage, likely does not constitute a search
under the assumption of risk doctrine,199 notwithstanding a
recent judicial suggestion to the contrary.200
196. Even a trespass to property is permissible if the one asserting the violation
lacks standing to contest the intrusion. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83
(1998) (holding persons invited into a residence solely to engage in a cocaine
bagging operation lacked standing—they possessed no reasonable expectation of
privacy—to contest a search of the residence by the police).
197. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding no reasonable expectation of
privacy in data given off by cell phone).
198. See Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1382 (2004) (explaining that prevailing assumption is that
an expectation of privacy is lacking in communications stored by a service
provider on the user’s behalf).
199. Id. at 1383 (arguing that so long as surveillance of electronic
communications reveal only source and destination of information and not the
content, substance or meaning of a communication, the surveillance is not a
search). At least one federal judge agrees, finding Smith applicable even where
the Government collects bulk telephone metadata from virtually all citizens. See
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The
fact that there are more calls placed [than in Smith] does not undermine the
Supreme Court’s finding that a person has no subjective expectation of privacy in
telephony [sic] metadata”). Id. at 752.
200. See Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0881, 2013 WL 6598728 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,
2013). Without reaching the Fourth Amendment merits, Judge Richard Leon
concluded that citizens likely have a reasonable expectation of privacy when the
Government, for purposes of protecting national security against terroristic
threats and with no particularized suspicion, collects and stores for five years the
telephone metadata of citizens for purposes of subjecting it to high-tech querying
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A final example of potential threats to privacy by
technological innovation is manifested by the possibility of
hidden video cameras with face-scanning capabilities
installed throughout the streets of a city.201 Such devices may
present virtually ubiquitous observation which, if known to
be present by citizens, may create in them a “constant state
of apprehension and self-consciousness whenever out in
public,” even though such technology likely does not invade
reasonable expectations of privacy under present assumption
of risk doctrine.202
If a move towards a regulatory approach to defining
Fourth Amendment scope is imminent, three problems arise:
(1) determining the form the new standard should take; (2)
determining the role, if any, the present atomistic privacy
and trespass tests should play with the addition of a new
regulatory standard; and (3) determining whether the
judiciary is institutionally capable of regulating
and analysis without any case-by-case judicial approval. Judge Leon attempted
to distinguish Smith by arguing that the massive governmental surveillance in
Klayman was on a scale so different from the “simple pen register” in Smith, that
“Smith is of little value” in assessing whether the Government’s actions in
Klayman constituted a search. Id. at *19.
Judge Leon did not explain why, if the defendant in Smith assumed the risk of
the government obtaining the numbers he dialed from his phone, citizens in
general would not also assume the risk of bulk retrieval by the government of the
numbers they dial—particularly in light of the Kyllo Court’s suggestion that
wholesale governmental surveillance of devices “in general public use”
(telephones in this case) is no more likely to be considered a search than the
retrieval of the phone numbers of a single individual as in Smith. See supra notes
144-45 and accompanying text. The attempt to distinguish Smith without
explaining why its assumption of risk premise is not applicable in Klayman is
thus unconvincing.
The situation discussed here and in note 201 infra represents a clear candidate
for resolution under a regulatory standard. I therefore recommend that courts in
subsequent considerations of the data mining issues raised in those cases consider
the proposals offered in this Article. See infra notes 219-46 and accompanying
text.
201. See Colb, supra note 55, at 138. Such technology is useful to law
enforcement. “Cameras using face-recognition technology watch over a downtown
nightlife district and match the faces picked up with a database of mug shots.”
David Callahan, Overmatched by Technology, WASH. POST, July 22, 2001, at B3,
quoted in Colb, supra note 55, at 138 n.79.
202. Colb, supra note 55, at 138.
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governmental
intrusions
employing
sophisticated
technology. The remainder of this Article will address these
issues. After proposing a specific regulatory test, I will argue
that the test should supplement rather than replace the
present Katz and Jones/Jardines standards and be applied
in a given case only after application of those standards, in
turn, yields no Fourth Amendment search. Finally, I will
recommend that legislatures take the lead in providing
regulations to protect privacy from high-tech governmental
encroachment, with courts playing a role only where judicial
action is clearly needed to provide a constitutional safety net.
A. Articulating a Regulatory Test
A host of commentators have joined Justice Harlan in
calling for a regulatory approach to defining Fourth
Amendment searches.203 Professor LaFave has offered a
particularly helpful formulation:
203. See supra notes 171-72. For Justice Harlan’s recommended standard, see
supra text accompanying note 59. Professor Amsterdam offered this early
proposal:
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is whether, if the
particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go
unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and
freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass
inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society. That . . . seems to
me the judgment that the [F]ourth [A]mendment inexorably requires the
Court to make.
Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 403.
Professor Solove offered a similar conceptualization: “[T]he crucial question[ ]
[is] . . . : [s]hould the government be able to gather [personal] information without
any oversight . . . [or] suspicion at all? . . . Should it be able to do this
systematically for millions of people without any limitation?” Solove,
Pragmatism, supra note 26, at 1530-31.
Yet another example of a regulatory proposal is put forward by Professor Serr:
[There are] two factors that courts must consider if the [F]ourth
[A]mendment is to be a living right—the nature of the privacy interest
implicated by the governmental surveillance and the intrusiveness of
that surveillance. When these two factors sufficiently coalesce—for
example, highly intrusive governmental surveillance of an important
individual privacy interest—the [F]ourth [A]mendment, with its
requirement of reasonableness, must regulate that governmental
conduct.
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[T]he matter must be viewed from a [broad] perspective. It must be
asked whether permitting the police regularly to engage in [a given]
practice, limited by nothing “more than self-restraint by law
enforcement officials,” requires the “people” to which the Fourth
Amendment refers to give “up too much freedom as the cost of
privacy.” That is, the fundamental inquiry is whether that practice,
if not subjected to Fourth Amendment restraints, would be
intolerable because it would either encroach too much upon the
“sense of security” or impose unreasonable burdens upon those who
wished to maintain that security. An affirmative answer to the
question, . . . might be given even when the privacy invasion
required very little effort by the police and “uncovered nothing of
any great personal value . . . .”204

This standard, rather than focusing on the atomistic
privacy interest of the citizen, addresses particular police
actions and assesses whether, if regularly practiced, they
would unduly compromise Fourth Amendment values of
personal privacy and security. If so, the practice is a search
regardless of its effects on the atomistic interests of any
particular person.
The LaFave formulation illustrates that regulatory
approaches defining Fourth Amendment scope inherently
entail value judgments.205 Evaluating police practices in
terms of underlying Fourth Amendment interests is a policyoriented enterprise inviting considerable subjectivity. Thus,
Professor Amsterdam, while himself articulating a
regulatory judicial standard, concluded that its application
by the Supreme Court would be “perfectly impossible.”206
Nevertheless, unless and until policymakers fashion rules
Serr, supra note 62, at 640.
Finally, Professor Slobogin argues: “Members of our society should be
constitutionally entitled to expect that government will refrain from any spying
on the home—technological or otherwise—unless it can demonstrate good cause
for doing so.” Slobogin, supra note 149, at 1411.
204. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 589-90 (footnotes omitted).
205. See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 36, at 318-19; supra text accompanying note
59 (“The critical question . . . is whether . . . we should impose on our citizens the
risks of the electronic listener . . . without at least the protection of a warrant
requirement”); supra text accompanying note 204 (“[T]he fundamental inquiry is
whether [a particular governmental] practice . . . [is] intolerable” in light of
underlying Fourth Amendment values).
206. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 403.
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protecting privacy in the modern technological world,207 the
Court will likely conclude that it has no other choice but to
enter the fray, fearing that the Fourth Amendment would
otherwise be rendered dormant at a time when citizens are
subjected to the possibility of an increasing array of
governmental intrusions into their private lives.
If a regulatory approach is to emerge, it is essential that
the standard ultimately embraced embodies objective criteria
to the extent possible208 to avoid requiring courts to decide the
search issue solely in terms of the policy preferences of
particular judges.209 Therefore, using the LaFave test as a
point of departure, I will propose a test aimed at
accommodating law enforcement, national security, and civil
liberties interests within a framework that provides a
modicum of objectivity.

207. The desirability of legislative rules as the means of protecting privacy while
enabling effective law enforcement is discussed infra notes 236-51 and
accompanying text.
208. An objective standard is important in order that the police have notice of
how they can conduct their investigations within the boundaries of the Fourth
Amendment. If the definition of searches and seizures is too vague, “[h]ow in the
devil is a policeman engaged in an investigation supposed to decide whether the
form of surveillance that he proposes to use [constitutes a search?]” Amsterdam,
supra note 2, at 403-04. “[T]he fourth amendment speaks to the police and must
speak to them intelligibly.” Id. at 403.
209. As described by Professor Herbert Packer, two separate value systems
operate simultaneously within the criminal process. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-73 (1968). The “Crime Control Model” is
premised “on the proposition that the repression of criminal conduct is by far the
most important function to be performed by the criminal process[,]” while the
“Due Process Model” focuses on protecting criminal defendants by designing
impediments to carrying accused persons through the process. Id. at 158, 163.
These models pose a “normative antinomy at the heart of the criminal law.” Id.
at 153. Most persons, including judges, while not totally disregarding the values
of one model, will tend to emphasize the values of the other. See id. at 153-54.
Such value preferences are highly subjective, given that “few conclusive
positions . . . can be reached by appeal to the Constitution.” Id. at 155.
Packer’s observations are sometimes clearly reflected in the orientations by
particular Supreme Courts. Thus, during the Warren Court era, the due process
model predominated, see WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 21, at 1-4, while
the post-Warren, Burger, Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have decidedly reflected
crime control model values, see id. at 4-12.
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As LaFave observes, the regulatory inquiry is directed at
protecting the people, society in general, from threatening
governmental intrusions. LaFave’s test essentially requires
the reviewing court to engage in a thought experiment: in
assessing whether a search has occurred, the court must
imagine whether the particular police practice at issue, if
unregulated and “regularly engaged in,” would “encroach too
much” upon “the people’s sense of security.” The “too much”
language clearly invites a weighing of governmental and civil
liberties interests. Therefore, I suggest that the test make
this balancing of interests explicit by adding Justice Harlan’s
requirement that the impact of particular police conduct on
the citizenry’s sense of security be “balanced against the
utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement [or of
protecting national security].”210 For any test to be effective,
it must allow necessary governmental investigation of
criminal activity and protection of national security while at
the same time protecting the Fourth Amendment interests of
citizens. As Professor Packer warned years ago, a test that
embodies only the values of law enforcement and rejects civil
liberties interests, or vice versa, would represent a
“fanatic[al]” approach.211
Such a problem potentially exists under LaFave’s
formulation of “regularly engaged in” police practices.212 His
test appears to invite courts to imagine the effects on the
public at large if any given police practice were “regularly”
engaged in, regardless of whether regular occurrence of the
practice is presently possible or reasonably likely to occur in
the future. The breadth of such an interpretation risks a
“fanatical” civil liberties bias by rendering virtually any
police activity a Fourth Amendment search, with the

210. Supra text accompanying note 59. I have added the “national security”
interest as a friendly amendment to the Harlan language. As evidenced by the
cases discussed supra notes 199-200, national security issues will likely join law
enforcement interests at the forefront of problems facing courts in future cases
raising Fourth Amendment search issues. For a final formulation of my proposed
standard, see infra text between notes 220-21.
211. See PACKER, supra note 209, at 154.
212. See supra text accompanying note 205.
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suppression of any evidence derived therefrom as a
consequence.213
Take for example the police practice at issue in
Greenwood.214 If the police regularly rummage through the
garbage of substantial numbers of citizens, surely the
practice would be alarming to many and thus likely
“encroach too much upon ‘the [people’s] sense of security.’”215
Or, considering the police practice in the Hoffa case,216 if the
police routinely plant undercover agents into the private
lives of vast numbers of citizens, the practice would obviously
constitute a search under the LaFave test. Likewise, if the
police extensively employ the surveillance technique utilized
in Ciraolo217 and observe the private property of significant
numbers of citizens by flying airplanes over their property,
the practice may well constitute a search.218 Even such trivial
things as a police officer directing a routine question to a
citizen on a public street could be deemed a search if the
police routinely and systematically confront substantial
numbers of citizens with even innocuous inquires.219 All
police encounters would thus be subjected to possible
scrutiny under the LaFave test, with the police left at the
213. With certain exceptions, the exclusionary rule excludes the fruits of illegal
searches and seizures from admission into evidence in criminal trials brought
against those whose rights have been violated. YALE KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 222 (13th ed. 2012).
Unless it can be shown that secondary evidence was discovered independently of
“taint[ed]” primary evidence, the secondary evidence will also be excluded as the
“fruit of the poisonous tree.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88
(1963).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91.
215. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 103.
217. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
218. Similarly, if the Oliver facts, supra text accompanying notes 76-81, were
extended and the police positioned officers in the “open fields” of a substantial
number of citizens, the sense of security of all citizens possessing open fields
would likely be compromised.
219. Such systematic confrontations could be deemed searches because they
encroach too much on the public’s sense of security even though the police do not
engage in a “Terry stop” by applying force, manifesting intimidating movements,
showing force, or speaking with an authoritative tone of voice. United States v.
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204, 207 (2002).
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mercy of a court’s conclusions under a highly subjective test.
Such a situation, if not resulting in virtually all investigative
police practices being deemed searches, would at a minimum
provide little guidance to the police as to which practices
constitute searches and those which do not.
The way to avoid these problems is to note the obvious
fact that some police practices, such as those reflected in
Greenwood, Hoffa, and Ciraolo, could never realistically be
employed in such wholesale ways as to threaten the security
of the public at large. The police simply do not have the
resources to go through everyone’s garbage, infiltrate
everyone’s life with an undercover agent, or routinely fly
planes over everyone’s private property. Such practices thus
pose little risk of encroaching on the general public’s sense of
security. Therefore, police practices that cannot realistically
be employed so extensively as to reasonably threaten the
general public’s sense of security should not be subjected to
the regulatory test.
With these considerations in mind, I propose the
following test: “A Fourth Amendment search occurs when
given governmental conduct—which realistically could
simultaneously impact a majority of the public—poses such a
threat to the public’s sense of security that it outweighs the
utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement or as
a means of protecting national security.” Requiring that the
practice be a “realistic” threat avoids subjecting purely
hypothetical public threats to scrutiny under the test.
Requiring that the threat be so extensive as to
simultaneously affect a “majority” of the public provides the
test with a degree of objectivity.220 While practices impacting
220. Rather than require exposure to a “majority” of the public, the test might
be couched in a variation of the language of the Kyllo Court: whether police
practice is “in general public use.” See supra text accompanying note 142. The
“majority” language is preferable because it allows for a more objective
determination of the extent of public exposure to the police practice. In his Kyllo
dissent, Justice Stevens complained that “how much use is general public use is
not even hinted at by the Court’s opinion . . . .” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 47 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover, avoiding the Kyllo language as
part of a regulatory standard is also desirable to avoid confusing the roles played
by the in “general public use” language in Kyllo and its possible inclusion in a
regulatory standard. In Kyllo, the in “general public use” language speaks to
whether a given technology is so commonly used as to render its access by the
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a significant minority of the public could arguably also
compromise the public sense of security, it is better to require
an impact on the majority of citizens to minimize subjective
debates among judges as to how many people it takes for the
“public” to be impacted by a given police practice.
My proposed test would thus subject to possible
regulation the kinds of wholesale technological intrusions
posed by satellite imaging, data mining of phone and internet
records, and face-scanning by hidden cameras described
above.221 However, not all uses of technology would be
scrutinized under the test. For example, the test would not
be applied to the use of the hidden transmitter in White222
because no realistic possibility exists that a majority of the
public could simultaneously be engaged by undercover
governmental agents wearing hidden transmitting devices.
Because they would be left unregulated under the test,
the police practices involved in such cases as Greenwood,
Hoffa, and Oliver would be permitted to continue. Such a
result accommodates law enforcement interests while not
risking erosion of the public’s sense of security. Finding a
search in Hoffa, for example, would essentially be the death
knell to the use of undercover police, deemed by many as an
effective, indeed necessary, practice in enforcing certain
areas of the law.223 Likewise, police investigations would be
government a non-search because the public assumes the risk of its access. See
supra text accompanying notes 148-49. On the other hand, the general use issue
under the proposed regulatory standard speaks to determining the existence of a
search if given practices were routine employed. For a discussion of the role
played by the assumption of risk doctrine should the proposed regulatory test be
adopted, see infra notes 226-44 and accompanying text.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 192-203.
222. See supra notes 100-11 and accompanying text.
223. The Supreme Court has recognized the necessity of undercover police work.
In rejecting the argument that the Fourth Amendment prohibited an undercover
police agent, posing as a drug buyer, from accepting an invitation of a drug seller
to enter his home to effectuate an illegal drug transaction, the Court said: “Were
we to hold the deceptions of the agent in this case constitutionally prohibited, we
would come near to a rule that the use of undercover agents in any manner is
virtually unconstitutional per se[ ],” a consequence at odds with the Court’s
acknowledgment that “in the detection of many types of crime, the Government
is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identity of its agents.” Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1966). Indeed, the Court noted that precluding
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significantly hampered if the activity in Ciraolo constituted
a search, perhaps leading to the ultimate conclusion that
police engage in searches whenever they conduct naked eye
observation of private property, whether from a plane or
otherwise, even though they engage in no trespass to
protected “houses” or “effects.”
To reiterate, the Supreme Court appears ready to adopt
a new, normative regulatory standard for defining Fourth
Amendment scope. When the Court makes this move, I
propose that it utilize the following test:
A Fourth Amendment search occurs when given
realistically
could
governmental
conduct—which
simultaneously impact a majority of the public—poses such
a threat to the public’s sense of security that it outweighs the
utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement or as
a means of protecting national security.
B. Retaining or Replacing the Atomistic Approach
Some commentators have concluded that in light of Kyllo
the Supreme Court has become uncomfortable with present
doctrine and may eventually abandon Katz entirely in favor
of a normative regulatory standard aimed at addressing the
realities of modern technology.224 Justice Sotomayor alluded
to such a move when suggesting it may be necessary to
reconsider the assumption of risk premise entailed in Katz

undercover police work would “severely hamper . . . ferreting out . . . organized
criminal activities that are characterized by covert dealings with victims who
either cannot or do not protest.” Id. at 210; see also United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264, 298 (1980) (“The Court acknowledges that the use of undercover policework is an important and constitutionally permissible method of law
enforcement.”); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557 (1977) (“Our
cases . . . have recognized the unfortunate necessity of undercover work and the
value it often is to effective law enforcement.”); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423, 434 (1973) (“Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy are necessary
weapons in the arsenal of the police officer.”) (quoting Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)).
224. See, e.g., Colb, supra note 55, at 123-24; Swire, supra note 115, at 913
(arguing that faced with problems posed by pervasive technology in the lives of
citizens, courts may overrule Katz explicitly).
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case law.225 While it is possible that the Court may eventually
replace Katz with a regulatory test, it is also possible, and I
will argue preferable, that the Court add the regulatory
standard while retaining the existing atomistic privacy and
property approaches.
Rather than suggesting the eventual abandonment of
Katz, Kyllo may more accurately be read as reaffirming the
continued viability of the expectation of privacy, assumption
of risk approach. Why else would the Court imply that
surveillance techniques involving devices “in general public
use” may, by that factor alone, render the technique a nonsearch?226 Furthermore, the Court had the opportunity in
Jones and Jardines to disavow expressly the privacycentered perspective of the Katz line of cases in lieu of its
reaffirmation of the trespass to property approach.227 Instead,
the Court chose to supplement the expectation of privacy
standard with one attending to invasions of property
interests. Thus, the Court appears to be in the business of
adding new alternatives to Katz rather than abandoning
assessments of reasonable expectations of privacy and
assumptions of risk.
Moreover, the Court has suggested that the
Jones/Jardines and Katz alternatives have a logical, serial
relation. The Jardines Court saw no reason to assess the dog
sniff situation under Katz because the property-rights
baseline provided an “easier” resolution of the search issue.228
Thus, the Court teaches that the tests are to be utilized in
order of difficulty of application: first, the trespass test; if no
search thereunder, then the privacy expectation test. Katz is
thus only applicable if no prohibited trespass occurs.

225. See supra text accompanying note 174.
226. See supra notes 142, 147-49 and accompanying text.
227. Some commentators have, however, argued that the trespass doctrine has
essentially predominated all along, Katz notwithstanding. Kerr, Fourth
Amendment, supra note 8, at 809 (“In most contexts, whether an expectation of
privacy is deemed reasonable can be answered by whether it is backed by . . . a
‘loose’ version of real property law.”).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82.
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The addition of a new regulatory standard should occupy
the third step in the order. If trespass assessments are
“easier” than considerations of privacy infringements,
determining whether a given police practice “encroaches too
much on the public’s sense of security” is clearly more
difficult still. While the regulatory standard is value-laden
and prone to subjective application,229 the assumption of risk
analysis under Katz is essentially an empirical matter230 and
relatively easy to apply. Therefore, courts should not turn to
the regulatory standard until they have determined that no
search has occurred, in order, under: (1) Jones/Jardines, and
then (2) Katz. Finding a search under the regulatory
standard as a third step in the process would thus not call
into question the efficacy of the first two steps when they
yield a no search finding. The regulatory prong would add a
new normative scrutiny of the surveillance practice. As
Professor Swire has observed: “[T]here is a clear and large
difference between a . . . holding[ ] [that] no ‘search’
prohibited by [Katz] [has occurred] and the claim that [the
practice] is normatively desirable.”231
Not only is the Supreme Court unlikely to abandon the
existing privacy and property standards and move entirely to
a regulatory approach, but such a move would be
undesirable,232 especially if the regulatory standard proposed
229. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. Justice Harlan came to see
the assumption of risk analysis as an empirical mirroring and reflecting society’s
risks without inquiry into the normative desirability of “saddling” the risks upon
society. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
231. Swire, supra note 115, at 920.
232. Professor Kerr has argued, among other things, that retaining the
assumption of risk doctrine is necessary to prevent “savvy wrongdoers [from
using] third-party services in a tactical way to enshroud the entirety of their
crimes in zones of Fourth Amendment protection.” Kerr, Third-Party, supra note
119, at 561, 564, 573-76. Kerr explains:
Without the doctrine, criminals could use third-party agents to fully
enshroud their criminal enterprises in Fourth Amendment protection. A
criminal could plot and execute his entire crime from home knowing that
the police could not send in undercover agents, record the fact of his
phone calls, or watch any aspect of his Internet usage without first
obtaining a warrant. He could use third parties to create a bubble of

1078

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

in this Article is adopted. That standard leaves unregulated
police practices that could not realistically impact a majority
of the public, thus freeing the police from Fourth Amendment
constraints under that standard so long as the nature of their
intrusions fall outside the regulatory test. Indispensable
atomistic privacy and property interests would be left totally
unprotected in such a situation if Katz and Jones/Jardines
were abandoned.233
Moreover, determining Fourth Amendment searches
solely in terms of a regulatory test is a bad idea even if the
chosen test were along the lines of LaFave’s proposal without
my proposed modifications. Such a test, with its unfettered
invitation to consider whether any police practice constitutes
an “intolerable encroachment on the public’s sense of
security” amounts to little more than a direction to courts to
engage subjectively in wholesale policymaking. While such
activity is not entirely precluded when courts apply the Katz

Fourth Amendment protection around the entirety of his criminal
activity.
Id. at 576.
233. Suppose, for example, that the government develops a one-of-a-kind x-ray
machine that can reveal all the activities within a home but, because of its
expense, can be used only extremely rarely. Use of such a machine without a
warrant, while blatantly offensive to atomistic constitutional values, would be
constitutionally permissible if my proposed regulatory standard were the sole
determiner of Fourth Amendment scope.
Theoretically, provisions of the Constitution other than the Fourth Amendment
might prohibit use of the hypothetical x-ray machine. Police actions “shock[ing to]
the conscience” are prohibited by the Due Process Clause. Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (holding two capsules believed to be narcotics
inadmissible where police entered defendant’s home without a warrant, broke
open the door to his bedroom, attempted to force open his mouth to retrieve the
capsules he was attempting to swallow, and took him to a doctor, who thrusted
an emetic solution into defendant’s stomach causing him to vomit up the
capsules—capsules held inadmissible because police conduct “shocks the
conscience”). The due process remedy is rarely available, however. See, e.g., Irvine
v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (finding no due process violation where police
made repeated illegal entries into defendant’s home for the purpose of installing
secret microphones, including one in his bedroom, from which they listened to his
conversations for over a month). Note, the Fourth Amendment was not applicable
in Irvine because at the time of the case the Amendment had not yet been held
applicable to the States.
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rubric, that approach at least reminds decision-makers that
they function as judges and not legislators.234
C. Legislative Input
In his dissenting opinion in Kyllo, Justice Stevens, joined
by three others,235 cautioned against the unwisdom of
attempting judicial solutions to the complicated Fourth
Amendment problems posed by modern technology:
Although the Court is properly and commendably concerned about
the threats to privacy that may flow from advances in the
technology available to the law enforcement profession, it has
unfortunately failed to heed the tried and true counsel of judicial
restraint. Instead of concentrating on the rather mundane issue
that is actually presented by the case before it, the Court has
endeavored to craft an all-encompassing rule for the future. It
would be far wiser to give legislators an unimpeded opportunity to
grapple with these emerging issues rather than to shackle them
with prematurely devised constitutional constraints. 236

234. Professor Amsterdam makes the point this way:
What is involved here is a matter of mood, of tone, of the basic attitudes
that shape a court’s perception of problems and its will to act upon them.
Certainly, in one sense all judges appreciate that the [F]ourth
[A]mendment is concerned with regulating police behavior. But it makes
a difference whether that regulation is conceived to be the primary thrust
of the amendment or a mere by-product of the amendment’s protection
of isolated enclaves of individual interest against invasion by particular
police actions.
Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 371.
235. Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in the
dissent.
236. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 51 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Other members of the Court have subsequently voiced similar reservations. See,
e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010), where Justice Kennedy,
joined by seven other Justices, said: “The Court must proceed with care when
considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made
on electronic equipment . . . . The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on
the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in
society has become clear.” In Quon, the Court found no Fourth Amendment
violation when government employers conducted a warrantless search of
messages sent on a police officer’s government-owned paper. Id. at 2633.
Critics of judicial involvement in the metadata gathering at issue in the cases
discussed supra notes 199-200 have argued:
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Others have expressed similar views, most persuasively
Professor Orin Kerr, who argues that democratically elected
legislatures
“possess
a
significant
institutional
advantage . . . over courts” in generating “effective rules
regulating
criminal
investigations
involving
new
237
technologies.” Judicial difficulty applying a regulatory test
The right check on our national surveillance programs, as they work
today, is not the Constitution, with which they clearly comply, but
politicians and the public, who are discomfited by them. In some cases,
they have reason to be: [a]buses do happen, oversight is necessary, and
the programs’ effectiveness has to be proven to the satisfaction of the
public.
In the first place, rather than convene a body to decide how it would like
to change the NSA’s programs, [as President Obama did], the executive
branch should have the intelligence community explain and defend
them. If, for instance, the collection of metadata is crucial to finding and
catching terrorists, then it should be strongly defended, not neutered as
a sop to the political moment. Instead of having the executive branch and
Congress decide whether holding metadata is justified by our nationalsecurity needs, the panel basically entrusts federal judges with
constantly revisiting that question on an individual basis. . . .
. . . [T]his question should ultimately be decided by the political branches
accountable to the people whose lives are at stake, not unaccountable
courts.
Editors, Judges, Leave the NSA Alone, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Dec. 20, 2013, 3:00
PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/366861/judges-leave-nsa-aloneeditors.
For an argument that the Supreme Court may be reluctant to become involved in
the NSA data mining controversy because of the Court’s perceived lack of its own
expertise to deal with sophisticated technological issues affecting Fourth
Amendment interests, see Mark Sherman, Technology? Some Justices Want to
Keep a Distance, ASSOCIATED PRESS: THE BIG STORY, (Jan. 7, 2014, 3:03 PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/technology-some-justices-want-keep-distance.
237. Kerr, Fourth Amendment, supra note 8, at 858. Legislative and judicial
rules differ in that “legislatures typically create generally applicable rules ex
ante, while courts tend to create rules ex post in a case-by-case fashion.” Id. at
868. Legislatures thus “enact generalized rules for the future, whereas courts
resolve disputes settling the rights of parties from a past event” resulting in court
rules “tend[ing] to lag behind parallel statutory rules and current technologies by
at least a decade.” Id.
Kerr’s views are strongly contested, however, by Professor Solove. See generally
Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided
Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747 (2005) [hereinafter Solove,
Codification] (rejecting Kerr’s claims of judicial inferiority as based on, for Solove,
faulty assumptions that are not well grounded in either theory or practice).
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defining Fourth Amendment searches led Professor
Amsterdam238 to propose that “all police search and seizure
activity . . . be regulated by legal directives that confine police
discretion within reasonable bounds.”239 A more modest
proposal is forwarded by Professor Christopher Slobogin,
who urges that Congress enact legislation prohibiting use of
technological devices under circumstances analogous to the
legislation currently treating the use of eavesdropping
instruments.240
Professor Kerr, as the leading proponent of judicial
restraint in the regulation of modern technology, invokes a
variety of reasons for his position.241 It is well beyond the
scope of this Article to articulate all, and assess the merits of,
these reasons. A brief list must therefore suffice: Legislatures
are said to craft more comprehensive and clearer rules than
courts,242 and because they “can act any time”—unlike courts
that must wait for a case or controversy to arise—they are
better able to respond at the early stages of an emerging
technology.243 Moreover, given the complexity of new
technologies, legislatures are arguably better able than

238. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 403.
239. Id. at 416. Professor Amsterdam further noted:
The rule of constitutional law that I urge is simple, having . . . only three
parts: (1) Unless a search or seizure is conducted pursuant to and in
conformity with either legislation or police departmental rules and
regulations, it is an unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the
[F]ourth [A]mendment. (2) The legislation or police-made rules must be
reasonably particular in setting forth the nature of the searches and
seizures and the circumstances under which they should be made. (3)
The legislation or rules must, of course, be conformable with all
additional requirements imposed by the [F]ourth [A]mendment upon
searches and seizures of the sorts that they authorize.
Id. at 416-17.
240. Slobogin, supra note 149, at 1396.
241. Professor Kerr offers an extensive argument for legislatures playing the
predominant role in regulating how the government should use its powers of
information gathering in the technological age. See Kerr, Fourth Amendment,
supra note 8, at 857-87.
242. Id. at 806.
243. Id. at 870.
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courts to understand the complexities and thus fashion more
effective rules.244
While I find Kerr’s points persuasive, others disagree,
with some offering point-by-point rebuttals of Professor
Kerr’s position.245 Others offer spirited arguments against the
judicial restraint position claiming, in one instance, that
legislatures “don’t . . . give a damn about the rights of the
accused”246 because voters have strong law enforcement
biases to which legislators respond.247 Such considerations
lead some to conclude that Congress simply defers to the
Court’s decisions, finding no Fourth Amendment searches
without exercising its constitutional prerogative of enacting
privacy legislation when those decisions inadequately protect
the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens.248
244. Id. at 807 (“Courts . . . lack the information needed to understand how the
specific technologies in cases before them fit into the broader spectrum of
changing technologies, and cannot update rules quickly as technology shifts.”).
245. See, e.g., Swire, supra note 115, at 918-19; see generally Solove,
Codification, supra note 237.
246. Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of
Public Choice; Or Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the
Accused, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1993); see also Swire, supra note 115,
at 914 (noting that the legislative process tends towards permitting greater
surveillance over time).
247. Id. at 1088-90. In discussing the interest in effective law enforcement,
Professor William Stuntz makes a similar point:
Here more than most places, politicians . . . deal with voters directly. And
crime is one of those matters about which most voters care a great deal.
Today it is regularly a major issue in elections at all levels of government,
and it has been an issue in local elections for more than a century. If
there is any sphere in which politicians would have an incentive simply
to please the majority of voters, it’s criminal law. . . .
Voters may know little about criminal law doctrine, but they presumably
have some idea of the set of results they would like to see: conviction and
punishment of people who commit the kinds of offenses that voters fear.
Legislators, one can fairly hypothesize, have an interest in producing
those results (or at least taking credit for them), so that voters will
continue to support them.
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 529-30 (2001).
248. See, e.g., Swire, supra note 115, at 921. A finding of “no search” by the Court
does not, of course, preclude legislative bodies from affording statutory provisions
affording greater protection of civil liberties than those afforded by the
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Again, it would require a separate article to thoroughly
defend the argument favoring judicial restraint. I therefore
must simply conclude here that I find it wise for courts
generally to defer to policymakers rather than themselves
fashioning rules regulating sophisticated surveillance
techniques. However, if the government employs modern
technology in ways which seriously call into question basic
Fourth Amendment rights of citizens, and legislative
protections are not enacted, then the Court should act to
protect the public’s “sense of security,” but then only to
resolve the instant case without proposing “all-encompassing
rule[s] for the future.”249 Judicial opinions should be confined
to announcing fundamental principles, with the hope that
Congress will then supply the details.250 As even critics of
Kerr’s judicial restraint position recognize, “[d]ialogue and
continued participation by both [judicial and legislative]
branches is likely to lead to better outcomes.”251
CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed the United States Supreme
Court’s perennial problem of articulating an adequate
standard to determine which governmental intrusions
constitute Fourth Amendment searches and seizures. As
shown, the reasonable expectation of privacy rubric of the
Katz case has proven controversial, especially in an era of
ever increasing technologically advanced surveillance
techniques. I have argued that the Court’s recent embrace of
the earlier discarded trespass to privacy standard, as a
supplement to Katz, signals that the Court is prepared to
openly consider new perspectives when defining Fourth
Constitution. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (holding no
violation of First Amendment rights of newspaper when police searched the
paper’s offices pursuant to a search warrant rather than seeking the desired
evidence by subpoenaing the paper to turn over the evidence). Congress
responded to Zurcher by enacting legislation requiring subpoenas as the preferred
method of seeking information from newspapers, thus granting greater protection
of First Amendment interests than those afforded by the Zurcher Court. See
Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2010).
249. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 51 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. Swire, supra note 115, at 905.
251. Id. at 922.
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Amendment scope. Indeed, as illustrated by my discussion of
Kyllo and the subsequent Jones and Jardines trespass cases,
the Court has now planted the seeds for the emergence of a
new normative regulatory approach.
In anticipating adoption of a regulatory alternative, I
have proposed specific language for such and argued that the
regulatory standard should supplement, and not replace, the
present tests and be utilized only when searches are not
found under, first Jones/Jardines, and then Katz. Finally, I
have urged judicial restraint when the regulatory alternative
is utilized, lest the courts become unduly involved in issues
more suited to the expertise of the legislative branch. I offer
these recommendations hoping to assist in the difficult task
of accommodating competing governmental and civil liberties
interests in a world of expanding technological intrusions
into the private lives of citizens.

